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  The portrayal of collective identity of Muslim populations in Europe presents an 
increasingly important issue within identity politics.  While European Muslims represent 
a diverse population that has experienced longstanding socio-political concerns, they are 
also increasingly portrayed in light of wider global perceptions of Islam in a post-9/11 
era.  Consequently, there is growing concern over a confusing of such pre-existing 
domestic issues and larger international problems of radical fundamentalism and Islamic 
terrorism.  The misrepresentation of European Muslims as linked to such issues in turn 
often exacerbates domestic problems and contributes to an evolving sense of oppositional 
Muslim identity in Europe.  In light of these concerns over inaccurate depictions of 
Muslims and their harmful effects, many of which will be expounded upon below, a more 
critical and deliberate approach is necessary in scholarly assessments of Muslim 
populations.  
 This thesis examines the situation of European Muslims amidst such portrayals of 
commonality and international influence. After discussing some facets of political 
identities and critiquing other approaches to this issue, the study focuses on the case of 
Muslims in France.  Using the lens of universalism, I examine the context of Muslims in 
France and evaluate the accuracy of assertions of common identity.  After illustrating the 
diversity of French Muslims, the study then turns to the situation of Muslims in Europe, 
comparing the French case with those of Great Britain and Germany.  Finally, it returns 
to the recent French national identity debate for concluding remarks.  The study 
demonstrates that, while portrayals of Muslims as a uniform threat to European identity 
are at present inaccurate and misleading, such assertions also carry potentially harmful 
effects in stigmatizing Muslims and contributing to oppositional identity formation. 






 Recently, identity politics, an interdisciplinary subfield that draws scholars from 
sociology, anthropology, political science, and cultural studies, has become an 
increasingly important subject of inquiry.  As the world evolves into an ever more tightly 
knit global community, questions of how people see themselves and each other – and 
become incited to violence in the name of one or the other – become quite important.  
Many scholars present ideas of opposing sources of identity, raising important questions 
about the origins and development of political and cultural identity and the ways in which 
these conceptions of identity influence contemporary issues. 
 An increasingly important subject in identity politics is the portrayal of collective 
identity of Muslim populations in Europe.  While European Muslims represent a diverse 
population that has experienced longstanding socio-political concerns, they are also 
increasingly portrayed in light of wider global perceptions of Islam in a post-9/11 era.  
Consequently, there is growing concern over a confusing of such pre-existing domestic 
issues and larger international problems of radical fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism.  
The misrepresentation of European Muslims as linked to such issues in turn often 
exacerbates domestic problems and contributes to an evolving sense of oppositional 
Muslim identity in Europe.  In light of these concerns over inaccurate depictions and their 
harmful effects, many of which will be expounded upon below, a more critical and 




Sources of Political Identity 
Nationalism 
Within the growing body of identity literature, scholars have focused on several 
sources of identity.  Many insist on the predominance of nationalism as the primary 
vehicle of political identity in the modern era.  In his seminal work, Imagined 
Communities, Benedict Anderson asserts that conceptions of the nation have dominated 
forms of political identity since they replaced religious and monarchical systems of rule 
in the wake of the Enlightenment.1  He describes the nation as a socially constructed body 
imagined by a community of members who perceive themselves to be bound by a 
common link.  Anderson claims that these communities are necessarily imagined, since 
citizens will never feasibly meet one another, and that they are also bounded by a sense 
of exclusivity and sovereignty in that a dynastic monarchy may not claim control over 
those who belong within them.   Anderson traces the predominance of the nation to the 
conditions of the industrial revolution, which he claims enabled its development and 
diffusion.  
While some such as Anderson see value in national identity and portray the focus 
on nationalism in a fairly positive light, others such as Ernest Gellner and Eric 
Hobsbawm have been more critical of the emphasis on the nation as sole political unit.  
Hobsbawm is particularly cautious of nationalism and the principle of national self-
determination, viewing this as too easily driven by the political will of a select group of 
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upper class elites.2  Other Marxist thinkers similarly emphasize the importance of class 
identity over that of the nation. 
Ethnicity 
Although Anderson’s conception of nations as ‘imagined communities’ finds no 
need for ethnic ties between citizens necessarily, others focus on the importance of 
ethnicity in forming collective identity. Anthony Smith also figures heavily in the 
national identity discussion, challenging Anderson’s assertion that the nation exists as a 
product of modernity.  Smith asserts that ancient nations have also existed and sees 
remnants of ethnic elements that survive in modern ones.3 He argues that characteristics 
of ethnic identity such as religion, customs, culture, kinship, ancestry, and homeland, can 
form the basis of nations as “ethnies,” and asserts that Anderson’s emphasis on the 
“imagined” nature of nations obscures these more tangible links that often exist beneath 
them.  Another eminent figure in the field of ethnic identity is Fredrik Barth, whose view 
of ethnic groups as interconnected, and often even interdependent, challenges traditional 
conceptions of ethnicities as bounded and fixed entities.4  He crafts a sense of ethnic 
identity as constructed, fluid, and based on concepts of inclusion and exclusion, ideas 
which have greatly influenced successive identity scholars. Similarly, another common 
issue in this area centers on whether ethnic and national identities are formed 
consciously5 or whether they emerge naturally from ‘primordial’ identities of cultural 
communities, stemming from collective experiences and contributing to the furthering of 
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common experience.6 Others, while noting the importance of ethnic identity, have been 
more wary of a focus on this identity form.  John Rex has written on the potential for 
exploitation of ethnic identities for political gain7 while Edward Said and other 
postcolonial scholars criticize ethnocentrism as a western phenomenon and question the 
authority of scholars to classify such forms of identity.8   
Challenging National Identity 
While, as Smith asserts, ethnicity can form the basis of nationality, it can also 
exist as a challenge to national identity through the presence of ethnic minorities.  This is 
merely one example of alternative identity sources, which many argue challenge, from 
both above and below the national level, the emphasis on the dominance of national 
identity. Thomas Hylland Eriksen examines ethnic subnational identities, which often 
remain despite the state’s efforts to incorporate them or despite members’ own efforts to 
integrate, which can be met with segregation politics.9 Much as Barthe does, Eriksen 
emphasizes the relationships between minority and majority ethnic identities as well as 
their fluidity and malleability. Other subnational challenges to national identity can form 
around social movements, which build identity around an existing feature of collective 
identity or the mobilization around a shared cause, as well as regional or even state 
identities. 10  
Additional challenges to national identity are presented by some who discuss the 
development of other structured identities above the national level.  With the increasing 
presence of regional political bodies such as the European Union (EU), many place a 
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growing emphasis on the development of corresponding supranational identities.11 The 
emergence of fluid borders with the Schengen Agreement and the cultivation of European 
citizenship and identity brings issues traditionally reserved to the state to the 
supranational level along with challenges to national identities.12  
Other scholars point to emerging transnational identities as further challenges to 
nationalism. Migration presents one potential source of this type of challenge, as 
newcomers bring foreign cultures and backgrounds into the traditional realm of the 
nation.  While immigrants can exist within a national context as a minority ethnic group, 
increasingly, facilitated by advanced transportation and telecommunication technologies, 
many migrants maintain strong transnational ties to more than one home country, 
blurring the relevance of proximity and territoriality to identity cultivation.13 This concept 
is supported by Randolphe Bourne, whose view of nationality focuses on the connection 
between a person and the “spiritual country” of his or her culture rather than physical 
location.14  Transnational identity projection is also increasingly seen with multinational 
corporations, international non-governmental organizations, and other groups that act as 
proponents of culture across the world.  Religion provides yet another source of 
transnational identity, with the bonds of Catholicism, Islam, and Judaism as specific 
examples of a global transnational ideology transcending national borders.15  
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Clash of Civilizations and Singular Identity 
Transnational religious and cultural identity forms the basis for Samuel 
Huntington’s now infamous “clash of civilizations” theory.  In The Clash of Civilizations 
and the Remaking of World Order, Huntington posits that future conflicts will emerge 
mainly around what he terms ‘civilizational’ identities, which he sees as the highest form 
of cultural and religious identity.16  He divides countries into categories of such 
civilizations, arguing that, in a post-Cold War era, the world will revert back to a system 
where conflict arises based on these civilizational identities rather than nationality.  
Particularly notorious has been Huntington’s claim that “Islam has bloody borders.” 
Huntington classifies Islamic civilization as one of two “challenger civilizations,” due to 
a disproportionally young population, an Islamic resurgence, and this civilization’s 
simultaneous borders with so many other civilizations.  Huntington asserts that 
civilizational conflicts are "particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims,” 
dating this history of conflict to the initial Muslim invasion of Europe and tracing it 
through the centuries. He points to exclusive Western Christian and Islamic claims to 
universalism as the reason for an increased likelihood of violence between these 
civilizations.  
Controversial assertions such as these have prompted many critiques of the Clash 
of Civilizations theory. Some critics have accused Huntington of perpetuating an 
aggressive stereotype that legitimates existing conflict.17  Many others argue against such 
civilizational categories altogether, asserting that they fail to account for positive 
interaction and interdependence across civilizational lines and neglect to capture the 
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relational and interactive aspects of culture, where values often transcend such divisions.  
Internal difference within civilizations is also ignored in the theory.18 Furthermore, 
Huntington’s broad claims do not address trans-civilizational elements, such as 
populations with roots in one civilization and citizenship in another.  Despite this lacuna, 
his ideas have been extended to issues in this realm, as will be shown later. 
Beyond the Clash of Civilizations  
  Amartya Sen directly challenges Huntington’s broad conceptions of identity 
based in ‘civilizations’ in his book, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. Sen’s 
own notion of identity is perhaps less rigid than others, which allows for his assertion that 
all people simultaneously embody a myriad of identities based on their various 
affiliations, interests, and opinions.19 Sen dismantles the concept of a singular cultural 
identity, stating that one may simultaneously be “without any contradiction, an American 
citizen, of Caribbean origin, with African ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, a woman, a 
vegetarian, a long-distance runner, a historian, a schoolteacher, a novelist, a feminist, a 
heterosexual, a believer in gay and lesbian rights, a theater lover, an environmental 
activist, a tennis fan, [and] a jazz musician.”20  According to Sen, civilizational identity is 
neither singular nor exclusive, nor does it necessarily determine one’s destiny.  The 
partitioning of the world into civilizations, he says fails to capture the “messiness” of true 
human identity. 
 In fact, Sen argues it is this insistence on singular, exclusive identities and their 
manipulation and exploitation that often results in many of today’s conflicts.  The focus 
on one characteristic, such as religion or culture, to the exclusion of others constitutes 
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according to Sen a “minimization” of human beings and their complex characteristics and 
beliefs. This minimization, Sen asserts, is dangerous for several reasons.  For one thing, 
minimizing people to one quality facilitates the creation of an enemy in others.  Viewing 
people as merely one aspect of identity and not as a collection of many characteristics, 
some of which may overlap and be shared with others, limits one’s ability to identify and 
empathize and permits an easier view of others as inherently and distinctly different.   
 Furthermore, minimized identities can easily be manipulated.  Sen suggests that a 
sense of persecution of an aspect of identity leads to increased identification with that 
quality and an easier view of non-members as “other.”  This principle can be exploited by 
those within or outside of a group who seek to garner support for a cause.  In support of 
this idea, Sen discusses the role of identity reduction in the Rwandan genocide, the 
Muslim-Hindu violence of India, and Nazi Germany, showing how in each case the idea 
of religious identity was deliberately manipulated to serve a violent purpose. Sen asserts 
that in order to escape this tendency towards identity-based conflict, human beings must 
be viewed as the fundamentally complex creatures they are, with the acknowledgment 
that they are more than one aspect of their identity.  For even in instances where cultural 
or ethnic identity is exploited for conflict, people continue to retain multiple identities. 
Thus, while "a Hutu laborer from Kigali may be pressured to see himself only as a Hutu 
and incited to kill Tutsis . . . he is not only a Hutu, but also a Kigalian, a Rwandan, an 
African, a laborer and a human being."21 While critics of Sen bemoan his failure to 
explain the mechanisms by which recognition of complex identity composition will result 
in decreased conflict, his theory nonetheless presents some interesting ideas which hold 
relevance in the world today.  
                                                 
 
 




Applying Theories of Identity: Muslims in Europe 
With such ideas of identity gaining salience in recent years, theoretical identity 
debates offer an interesting perspective from which to examine contemporary issues and 
conflicts.  Perhaps nowhere is this identity literature more relevant than, quite ironically, 
in what most accept to be the very birthplace of the nation itself: Western Europe.  
Recently, ongoing identity debates have taken center stage, with European national 
identities challenged by subnational, transnational, and supranational elements.  From the 
supranational level, much anxiety has been raised over the question of a European 
identity and whether this could pose a challenge to nationalism.22  From the subnational 
and transnational level, Europe has faced a considerable amount of tension around its 
growing Muslim population.  This issue has proven to be a contentious one within many 
countries and has sparked identity debates on the national and European levels.  The 
dynamics of this situation and the important implications for identity politics render it an 
interesting focus for a discussion of identity issues.   
Much of today’s European Muslim population has roots in the waves of 
immigration that followed the World Wars and brought tens of thousands of new 
immigrants to Europe from many predominantly Muslim countries in North Africa, Asia, 
and the Middle East.  Years after this initial immigration, a great portion of this 
population, now second and third generations deep, remains visibly unintegrated into 
European society. Muslims in Europe often live physically separated in suburban areas 
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around large cities, where, frequently due to discrimination, they experience 
disproportionally higher rates of unemployment, crime, and violence.23 With this physical 
separation has also come the perception of an extreme cultural difference and accusations 
that this population of Muslim immigrants has been less able or less willing to assume 
“European” identities than previous groups.  
Over recent years, tensions between immigrant populations and native Europeans 
have grown into bouts of riots and violence that have captured the attention of media 
worldwide.  In 2005 rioting broke out in over 300 French cities in response to the deaths 
of two Arab-French youths who were running from the police.  The media portrayed the 
young Arab French rioters as part of a “Muslim uprising” or “French intifada”24 belying 
the misconceptions that many have of their Muslim neighbors.  Additional chaos and 
media attention surrounding events elsewhere in Europe such as the Rushdie Affair in 
Britain, the political cartoon scandal in Denmark, and the murder of Theo Van Gogh in 
the Netherlands have led to a common perception that efforts to integrate Muslim 
immigrants into European society have failed miserably. 
 In the search to frame the issue of the growing Muslim presence in Europe, many 
have turned to identity concepts. One strong tendency in this, however, has been to view 
Muslims in Europe through the broad, blanketing lens of the “clash of civilizations” 
theory rather than with the subtlety that Sen argues is necessary. The continuation of 
marginalization and sporadic violence has resulted in speculation that immigrants 
represent an extension of an Islamic culture that is simply incompatible with secular or 
Christian European ideals. Many seem to have drawn on the themes of Huntington’s 
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work, portraying the growing Muslim presence as a natural continuation of centuries-long 
conflict to “bloodily defin(e) the boundaries of Christianity and Islam.”25  
Unfortunately, this tendency to over-generalize based on incidents of violence and 
civilizational divisions leads to a growing perception of European Muslims as a 
homogenous group marked by violent radicalization and unbreakable ties to the Arab 
world.  While elements of violence, fundamentalism and transnational links have played 
a part in the history of integration of Muslims, it has been a minor role and is certainly 
not indicative of the entire population.  Nonetheless even reputable scholars and 
publications have not escaped the temptation to make overarching claims about European 
Muslims that quite often border on the ridiculous. For instance one statement that “the 
common denominator that links them [Muslim immigrants] to the Muslim world is their 
sympathy for Palestine and Palestinians”26 completely neglects the possibility of variation 
in political opinion between European Muslims.  Others have generalized about a Muslim 
desire to impose Sharia law in Europe, implying that European Muslims bring with them 
unseverable ties to a culture shown as inherently less civilized, and that in many cities, 
“all you ha[ve] to do to travel from a modern, post-Enlightenment democracy to a strict 
patriarchy out of seventh century Arabia [is] to walk a few blocks.”27  Such portrayals 
have resulted in the widespread use of the term “Eurabia,” a term coined by Bat Ye’or to 
portray a Europe that she claims has grown “subservient to the ideology of jihad and the 
Islamic powers that propagate it.”28 Others have contributed to this perception with the 
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notion of “Londonistan,” as a breeding ground for terrorism.29  This kind of rhetoric, 
which is quickly entering common vocabulary, demonstrates a tendency to view 
European Muslims as essentially extensions of a very characterized image of the Muslim 
world.  Many of these scholars neglect to mention the distinctions between European 
Muslims or the thousands who have embraced European life, choosing to focus on 
depictions of this population as homogenous, radicalized, and dangerous. “Europe's 
emerging mujahedeen [that] endanger the entire Western world”30 becomes a perception 
of the norm, rather than the exception.  Even less violent portrayals have still generally 
held to overarching negative stereotypes of Muslims in Europe, often rendering them the 
scapegoats for other problems.  Muslims in Europe have been blamed for a variety of 
other social ills, from unemployment to population crises to ghettoization to the 
prediction of the very downfall of Europe itself.31   
Certainly not all scholars have contributed to the portrayal of Muslims in such a 
stereotyping manner.  Indeed, many have produced comprehensive studies that have shed 
light on the many complexities of the European Muslim population.32 Others have added 
the histories of the many European Muslims who have successfully integrated into 
influential positions in Europe, recounting their experiences and relationships with native 
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Europeans.33  However, the volume of works that conversely portray Muslims in a 
unifying, negative light continues to greatly influence perceptions and shape the public 
discourse regarding integration issues by creating a widespread sense of fear and 
misunderstanding.  The rise of such fears, often amounting to a growing “Islamophobia,” 
contributes to the success of radical right wing parties that demonize immigrants such as 
France’s Front National, the Dutch Freedom Party, and others who capitalize on 
misconceptions and fears. 
This continued battle over how to conceive of Muslim populations has had 
implications for identity politics on many levels.  Faced with surfacing identity-related 
issues surrounding the integration of Muslim populations, many countries have turned 
inward to examine their own conceptions of national identity and citizenship.  In this 
context, the controversial assertions put forth by many scholars regarding the threat of 
growing Muslim populations have acted as a catalyst for debates on national and 
European identities.  
Perhaps nowhere is this controversy and its links to national identity more 
apparent than in France, whose traditional preoccupation with national identity verges on 
obsession. With its tradition of Republican universalism, French political philosophy 
places unique emphasis on an identity of national citizenship while refusing to 
acknowledge subnational identities, particularly those concerning religion. The tension 
between this political history combined with perceptions of a threatening Islamic 
subnational identity have resulted in several high profile events in recent years, including 
the ban of religious symbols in schools as well as recent discussions of Islamic dress and 
national identity debates. In light of the extraordinary weight given to its national identity 
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and the recent controversy over symbols of Muslim identity, France provides an 
interesting case study for this examination of interaction between Muslim and national 
identities.  Despite this unique emphasis on identity, however, the issues debated in 
France are typical of those in wider Europe.  Identity debates center on a perceived threat 
of a Muslim population portrayed as cohesive and similar.  In reality, though, French 
Muslims, as those elsewhere in Europe, present many internal divisions and differences 
that render them far from uniform.    
Overview 
In this thesis, I seek to expand on some of these ideas concerning the collective 
identity of European Muslims.  I confront the portrayal of European Muslims as a 
homogenous threat to European identity using the basis of Sen’s concepts of identity as 
fundamentally multiple and complex.  The study focuses on the French case in particular, 
offering a detailed look at both the challenge of Muslim presence to a conceived national 
identity as well as the implications of the continued portrayal of Muslims as a 
homogenous community.  I find that, while both French national identity and Muslim 
identity are shown often as fixed and uniform, neither is as clear cut as portrayed.  French 
conceptions of national identity are marked by historical and contemporary 
contradictions, while French Muslims experience a plethora of internal divisions that 
prevent them from exhibiting a homogenous group identity.  There is evidence to 
suggest, however, that subnational identities do exist within France and that these risk 
growing more cohesive and religion-based with the continued portrayal of the Muslim 
population in collective religious terms.  When taken to the European level, similar 
tendencies persist.  European Muslims exhibit even more internal differences than those 
in France, with the insistence on their homogeneity resulting in further complications. 
This thesis proceeds as follows.  The second chapter examines much of the 
relevant literature concerning the integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe, critiquing 
 15 
some of the other approaches to the studying of this issue.  The third chapter offers an in-
depth case study of Muslims in France and the evolution of collective identity within the 
particularities of French national identity conceptions. Here I use Celestin and 
DalMolin’s framework of ‘universalism in crisis’ to position the development of Muslim 
identity within the French context, highlighting several notable events which have shaped 
perceptions of French Muslims.  Chapter four takes a broader, more comparative 
perspective of Muslim identity at the European level, examining the cases of Muslims in 
Great Britain and Germany for comparison with the French case and analyzing trends on 
a wider scale.  Finally, chapter five provides a look at the current French national identity 
debate before offering concluding insights gathered from the study.  Overall I find that a 
lens of identity is the most useful one through which to consider the issues of Muslim 
integration in Europe, but that assertions of a common Muslim identity, in France and in 
wider Europe, have been much exaggerated thus far and have led to unhelpful policy 
trends.  I argue, however, that there is potential for the development of a collective 
Muslim identity in the future, encouraged ironically by the continued portrayal of this 






INTEGRATION AND ISLAM IN EUROPE: A REVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE 
 
 Increasingly over the last few decades, Muslim immigration to Europe has 
arisen as a major issue in European domestic and international politics, prompting many 
recent studies in related areas. Scholars have approached the subject from a variety of 
fields, employing an array of methodological and conceptual tools for examining the 
question of Muslim integration, including comprehensive historical, economic, and social 
analyses as well as comparisons of national policies, periods of immigration, and 
immigrants of different origin, many of which point to different causes of tension.  
Multiple levels of analysis also come into play, with scholars addressing the question at 
the local, national, European, and wider regional levels. While this variety adds a 
richness to the debate, it also contributes to the complexity of examining what lies at the 
heart of the issue.  The contention surrounding integration topics becomes apparent in 
debates over terminology, while the elusiveness of measurement of related concepts 
remains a challenge for those who enter the debate.  Despite a plethora of methodologies 
and theories, few seem to get at the heart of why Muslim immigrants and their 
descendants apparently continue to struggle to successfully assimilate into European 
society. Many of these approaches as well as their benefits and shortfalls are explored 
here.  I argue that an identity framework is the most useful through which to examine 
issues of Muslim integration in Europe. 
Clashes of Islam and Christianity (or Secularism) in Europe 
 As mentioned earlier, one recurring theme in the literature situates current 
European conflicts with Muslim populations within a long history of European clashes 
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with the Muslim world.  Part of this line of reasoning emphasizes the consolidating 
power of religion in this context in bringing together traditionally factious groups against 
a common group or idea.  While scholars seem to generally agree on the influence of 
Christianity in uniting Europe in the past against the invasion of Muslim forces and draw 
comparisons between the unifying nature of Christianity in the Middle Ages and the 
secular European Project today, authors differ on the role of the EU in today’s 
relationship with the Muslim world.  While some see the EU as offering a path to 
integration for Muslim immigrants through minority rights legislation and the possibility 
of adopting a new “European” identity along with their host societies, 34 others view the 
EU-Muslim relationship as almost inherently antagonistic.  In his recent book, 
Reflections on the Revolution in Europe; Immigration, Islam, and the West, Christopher 
Caldwell shows how the European openness and tolerance that allowed for Muslim 
immigration en masse has now become the basis by which immigrants oppose European 
society.35  He asserts that the unification of Europe now encourages the consolidation of 
Muslims in the same way it did centuries ago under the Christian faith: by presenting the 
opposing side with a challenge to predominance in the region.  In this logic, rather than 
making mutual concessions to one another, Muslim immigrants and native Europeans 
actually reinforce the others’ opposition because of their cultural differences in this age-
old struggle.  In his book, however, Caldwell and others in this camp of literature fall into 
the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ trap of making blanket statements about all Muslims in 
Europe, failing to recognize the differences in this population and perpetuating unhelpful 
stereotypes based on historical struggle.  
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Exceptionalism of Muslim Immigrants 
 These allusions to historical tensions between Europeans and Muslims 
implicitly lead to a more direct debate over whether Muslim immigrants present a 
distinctively different challenge to Europe compared to other immigrant populations.  
One study by Alberto, Pattacchini, Veridier  and Zedou using British survey data finds 
that Muslim immigrants to Britain “integrate less and more slowly than non-Muslims” 
and retain stronger religious identities after decades of life in Britain than do their non-
Muslim counterparts, regardless of education and neighborhood segregation.36  This 
finding seems to support the clash of civilization theories mentioned above.  The authors 
of this study, however, offer no explanation of a causal link and present their findings 
only as unsupportive of mainstream political movements favoring diversity.  Other 
scholars, such as Manning and Roy, contradict these findings, quantitatively showing that 
Muslim immigrants in Britain actually integrate no more slowly than those of other 
backgrounds, and that in fact immigrants from poorer and less democratic countries 
generally assume a British identity much more quickly than those from first world 
democracies.37  Qualitative studies also challenge the notion that Muslim immigrants are 
culturally or religiously hindered from integrating into European society. A study by 
Hargreaves argues that Muslim immigrants are disadvantaged, not by exceptionalism due 
to culture or religion, but rather by socio-economic and political changes that make it 
more difficult to integrate.38  Other studies echo this idea, such as one by Marie-Claude 
Blanc-Chaléard, which refutes claims of exceptionalism by drawing interesting parallels 
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between earlier waves of immigration of Italian immigrants to France and the recent 
Muslim population in terms of discrimination, perceptions of racial differences, and 
violence, and point rather to differences in colonial histories and changes in national and 
global circumstances as sources of contemporary conflict.39 Thus, scholars in this area 
have produced a variety of studies supporting an assortment of contradictory claims about 
the exceptionalism of Muslim immigrants.  Nonetheless most continue the trend to 
address “Muslims” in a national or international context as the distinctive community in 
question as though they are an internally consistent group.  
Race, Religion, Ethnicity, or Immigration – What Is the Salient Issue? 
Within this debate over the exceptionalism of Muslim immigrants, another area 
centers on which characteristics of today’s groups are the most salient, and whether 
religion, race or ethnicity lies at the heart of the question of exceptionalism. This 
discussion also serves to peel away layers of the debate, often rendering a comparison 
easier to make.  Scholars differentiate between the three terms based on their belief of 
what is preventing successful integration, resulting in a difference in terminology across 
the debate.  Some authors resist calling the issue a ‘Muslim’ question and thus prefer to 
use ethnic relations terminology.40 Others focus on the subject of race over religion or 
ethnicity, which allows for comparison with the United States or other countries or 
regions where immigration or minority ethnic populations do not have a large Muslim 
component. In comparing the U.S. and Europe specifically, some authors focus on race 
and point to the combination of religious, immigration, and minority issues as the cause 
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of the particular contention in the European situation.41  Largely, however, the debate 
focuses on specifically “Muslim” immigrants, with scholars such as Cesari, 42 Laurence 
and Vaisse43 justifying the focus on religion as the central quality used by sociologists in 
defining the most recent stage of integration and also by members of the population in 
forming their perceptions. These scholars do not view Islam as the cause of integration 
difficulty - Laurence and Vaisse strongly assert that it is not - but rather the identifying 
characteristic of the most recent wave of immigration at this time.  By focusing on a 
single factor, scholars have been able to compare integration success across countries and 
regions, such as Cesari’s comparison of Muslims in Europe and the U.S., where she 
explores different policies, perceptions, and identities in both cases.44  In addition to 
adding a practical aspect of comparison, the classifying this wave of immigration as 
Muslim gets at part of what is at the heart of the debate: that regardless of their place of 
origin, whether Pakistan, Morocco or Turkey, the populations in question largely share a 
Muslim faith.  This classification though, however neat it may render the situation, may 
in turn also contribute to the problem by casting the population in question in a single 
negative light.  Nonetheless, the differences in terminology themselves continue to show 
the many elements of difference that transect broad religious lines and demonstrate some 
of the difficulty in broadly classifying people according to one religious identity.  
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Integration Policy: Assimilation vs. Multi-Culturalism 
While transatlantic comparisons such as Cesari’s prove interesting, most comparative 
studies contrast different European integration models and their effectiveness.  To a large 
extent the debate in Europe has explored variations in integration models ranging from 
assimilation to multiculturalism, with the classic comparison between France and Britain.  
Adrian Favell contrasts these two countries and explains their adherence to opposing 
models based on what he terms their “public philosophies,” or political dialogues through 
which policies are formed based on national myths.45  These philosophies he says become 
ingrained due to path dependence, resulting in inconsistent and ineffective policies that 
cannot adapt to changing circumstances.   
Other studies show the effects of adherence to various models on the assimilation-
multiculturalism spectrum, with varying results. Ersanilli and Koopmans compare 
integration of Turkish immigrants in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, with the aim 
of evaluating the effectiveness of national integration models. 46 By and large, while 
integration policies certainly have an effect on immigrants and their descendents, none in 
Europe appears to be seeing much success.47  Contradictory results show that, while 
French universalism is exceptionally rigid in denying a dual identity, more laissez-faire 
policies in Britain result in the development of parallel societies.  Even traditionally 
hybrid-integration models and traditionally tolerant multicultural societies such as the 
Netherlands have experienced the effects of serious integration shortcomings. The 
prevalence of similar integration difficulties across countries despite such different 
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integration policies suggests that there must exist either something common to all 
approaches or a factor beyond integration policy inciting the same problem.   
While approaches such as Favell’s are useful in exposing some of the “myths” 
behind conceptions of national identity and integration philosophy, most comparisons of 
national integration policies have produced few helpful conclusions, since the immigrant 
populations within them are so different.  Even in studies such as Ersanilli and 
Koopmans’, where the origins of immigrants is held constant, while scientifically more 
sound than others, they are limited in benefit since most populations in question do not 
fall into this category of rural Turkish immigrants.  Nonetheless, this area of study makes 
important steps in recognizing and illuminating the differences that exist between 
national contexts to shape the experiences of Muslims within them.  
Socioeconomic Factors  
 Beyond the deficiencies of specific integration models, scholars examine several 
other factors as barriers to Muslim integration in Europe.  Many point to socioeconomic 
factors as major hindrances to the incorporation of Muslims into society.  High 
unemployment rates plague Muslims across European countries, sometimes up to four 
times the national average48 with marked discrimination being blamed for much of this.49  
One study done by The Pew Global Attitudes Project shows the greatest concern of 
Muslims in all European countries surveyed to be unemployment, suggesting that 
Muslims in Europe face real challenges in this area.50 In her comparison of Italian 
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immigrants of the inter-war period and later Algerians, Blanc-Chaléard points to 
differences in the economic climate during the trente glorieuses, the thirty years of 
economic growth in France after World War II, as opposed to the economic downturn of 
the 1970s and 80s as a distinguishing factor between the two groups’ integration 
circumstances. Nonetheless, this comparison also rests on the facilitation of Italians 
through workers rights groups that were not the focus of issues during later periods of 
North African immigration.  This suggests the interplay between economic and identity 
factors in integration.  While economic concerns factor heavily in the lives of European 
Muslims, they also contribute to a wider sense of discrimination and inequality that 
spreads beyond economics.  This sense of inequality and alienation breeds more 
dissatisfaction than economic struggles alone.51   
Thus, while socioeconomic factors surely influence the situation of Muslim 
immigrants, especially combined with discrimination, this cannot be the only variable at 
play. As others have pointed out, socioeconomic concerns are a serious concern for many 
immigrants, regardless of origin or religion, with most non-Muslims also facing very real 
challenges to economic success in their new countries.52  Furthermore, particularly in 
Britain, Muslim immigrants hail from a range of origins and vary to a great extent in their 
economic security.53 Pauly quotes Mark Brown that “some of the [widest] economic 
differences occur within broad racial groupings, particularly the South Asian population, 
within which Indians appear relatively successful, whereas Pakistanis, and to an even 
greater extent Bangladeshis, stand out as disadvantaged communities within the Asian 
and national population.  These differences display the many variations that may cut 
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across religious lines.  Finally, the issue of radicalization has never been convincingly 
tied to poverty54 but remains a concern among European Muslims.  It seems likely that 
economic factors such as unemployment do influence integration, but perhaps more 
because of the effects of discrimination rather than pure economics.  Karich states in his 
article on “Economic Development of Muslim Communities” that “discrimination 
towards minorities has increased in recent decades [and] the consequences of this 
discrimination are also often understated.  Stress, loss of self-confidence, 
discouragement, frustration, insecurity and the absence of prospects or the inability to 
plan projects are all perfect ingredients for marginalisation.”55  
Middle East Spillover and the Role of Terrorism 
Another issue pertinent to the ongoing question of the growing Muslim presence 
in Europe is that of Islamic fundamentalism and ties to global jihadist movements.  
Seemingly every volume addressing the issue of Muslim immigration in Europe includes 
a chapter on Islamist violence or terrorism, tying integration issues more closely to 
security concerns.  Others directly claim that radicalization and general conflicts 
concerning Muslims in Europe are merely a reflection of a wider political context driven 
by events in the Middle East, hinting once more at the influence of civilizational clash 
ideas.56  This, Cesari says, is “confusing the issues” of integration, identity, and Islam.57  
For example, there was no evidence of Islam or an outside Islamic actor as a motivator in 
the 2005 riots, and efforts by religious groups to quell or mediate the outbursts saw no 
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success.  Furthermore, rioters made no political demands, neither did they reference 
outside conflicts or show any other signs of solidarity with global Islam. While ties have 
been discovered between violent Islamist groups and France and radicalization is 
undeniably a factor among particularly second and third generation European Muslims, it 
is likely that integration problems are allowing for this rather than vice versa. 
Nonetheless, global conflicts involving Muslims can perhaps play a role to the extent that 
they affect the perception of persecution of religious identity.  
Identity 
Despite the plethora of studies employing methodology and analytical approaches 
of many kinds, few have made headway in determining the source of integration 
difficulty, suggesting that the integration question has been shaped incorrectly. The wide 
range of studies conducted on Muslim populations in Europe often reflects the temptation 
to depict European Muslims as a collective and homogenous population.  These 
assumptions, however, prove to be unhelpful in identifying and assessing the issues 
within integration since populations of Muslim immigrants across the continent differ 
immensely in a variety of areas.  Immigrants to Europe from the Muslim world have 
arrived over different periods of time which generally go unnoticed, with most now 
existing as European citizens.  European Muslims have their roots in an extremely wide 
range of countries from which they bring their own backgrounds and ethnicities, 
traditions, and perceptions of Europe and the specific countries to which they immigrate.  
While some studies do acknowledge the role of national integration policies in shaping 
the experiences of Muslims in Europe, which constitutes another large difference, the 
complex relationships between national identity myths and integration principles are 
poorly understood.  Additionally, European Muslims are divided between ethnicities, 
colonial pasts, generational differences, political opinions, and personal preferences, 
among others.   
 26 
Given these many divisions which cut across the European Muslim population, 
Sen’s conception of identity as varied and multifaceted proves a much more constructive 
lens through which to examine this issue. Sen’s assertion finds support in the difficulty in 
merely pinpointing the salient, unifying quality of immigrant populations in Europe. 
Most of the recent wave of immigrants to Europe are Muslim, but they also hail from 
different countries, regions, political systems, socioeconomic situations, and educational 
backgrounds, and hold different views on issues such as democracy, gender roles, 
politics, and even specific aspects of Islam and its role in politics, all of which shape their 
interactions with their host society.  They have their own within-group divisions across 
lines of age, beliefs, politics, and economic standing that differentiate between members 
of this population.  In reducing this group of people with different qualities and views to 
one homogenous group of Muslims, both societies and immigrants “miniaturize,” in 
Sen’s terms, the members of the populations in question. 
Thus, given the shortfalls of studies which assume the homogeneity of Muslims 
and their experiences, the relevant question must first be whether a collective identity 
exists between European Muslims.  The next two chapters undertake this question, 
examining the Muslim populations in France and then comparing the complex reality of 
Muslims in this context to those in Great Britain and Germany. I find that not only are 
assumptions of collective identity premature, but that they are also potentially harmful in 
contributing to the creation of a potentially negative and oppositional identity within this 
population.   
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CHAPTER 3 
MUSLIM IDENTITY IN FRANCE: IMPLICATIONS OF 
PORTRAYED SIMILARITY 
 
In this section I offer an examination of the complex representations of Muslim 
identity in France.  Using Celestin and DalMolin’s framework of “Universalism in 
Crisis,” I assess the presence of a Muslim identity in the French context, with its unique 
history of laïcité and universalism.  This specific case and framework present an 
interesting perspective from which to examine identity since the French approach to the 
subject is so unique, while the situation itself remains an example typical of what is 
presented as a Europe-wide issue.  
The French conception of national identity plays an extremely important role in 
political and social life and has been the subject of recent government led conversations 
and studies.58 Stemming from the Enlightenment-era philosophies of the French 
Revolution, the concept of a strong national identity has preoccupied the French for 
centuries.  The Third Republic in particular took upon itself a mission to cement concepts 
of a cohesive national identity into French society through centralized government-
controlled education, an insistence on the learning of standard language and shared 
history, and mandatory military service.  Today, the identity conversation lives on, as 
France confronts the idea of a national identity in the midst of a seemingly ever more 
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diverse population.  The recent influx of largely Muslim immigrants who have struggled 
to integrate into French society has contributed to the sense of a lost French cultural 
identity and has spurred fears of “communautarisme,” or factionalism, that purportedly 
threatens French universalism.59 Thus, the French case presents an interesting place to 
examine the identity of Muslims vis-à-vis the state.  While, as shown earlier, Muslims in 
Europe are often portrayed as a homogenous community of “Islam” as a whole, they are 
in fact quite a diverse and divided population.  Conversely, conceptions of French 
national identity, based in secular ideals of universal republicanism prove often hazier 
than they are credited.  In this area I draw on ideas by Celestin and DalMolin’s book, 
France from 1851 to the Present: Universalism in Crisis, in which the authors illustrate 
the many challenges to French universalist concepts of identity.60 
In the section that follows, I briefly describe some of the ideas that shape French 
conceptions of national identity before presenting the demographic data and other 
relevant information that helps to establish a more accurate portrait of Muslims in France.  
I then use three examples of the construction of the Paris Mosque, the headscarf affair, 
and the 2005 Paris riots to illustrate the complexity of both France’s relationship with 
religion and identity and the complex internal divisions between its Muslim communities.  
The statistics and examples shown suggest that the Muslim population in France is far 
more nuanced than typically portrayed and that its grouping together as a religious body 
is more an outside label given to Muslims than an assumed identity that they perceive 
themselves as sharing.  Following these examples, however, I look at some evidence 
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suggesting that a common identity could develop in the future, due to shared experiences 
of discrimination and isolation as well as an external insistence on religion as a label. 
French Universalism 
French national identity is a complicated topic, which even today has been the 
subject of a national study and public debate in France initiated by the government.61  
While it would be impossible to comprehensively illustrate what all this idea entails in 
such a limited space here, some notion of the basis of French concepts of identity are 
useful in looking at the relationship of Muslims with the state.  Celestin and DalMolin 
base their study specifically on the concept of universalism, an approach which I adopt to 
some extent here.  Universalism has existed as a pillar in French political thought since 
the creation of the French Republic, which was driven by the ideals of the Enlightenment.  
Thinkers of this period emphasized a reliance on reason and embraced concepts of 
inalienable rights and equality that led to revolutionary movements and challenges to the 
historical ties between the monarchy and the Catholic Church.  The ideas of the French 
philosophes provided justification for the Revolution and laid the foundation for a new 
government based in equality, Republicanism, and laïcité, or a strict interpretation of 
secularism.   
Despite an emphasis on individual rights, however, the ideals of the Revolution 
also included important concepts of community, citizenship, and public discourse.  
Particularly influential during this period was Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social 
Contract, which many leaders appropriated as a manual for the Revolution and the 
construction of the French Republic.  Rousseau’s ideas of a society based in “general 
interests and shared values over individual interests and pluralism” would develop into a 
                                                 
 
 




uniquely French political philosophy.62 This approach relies on a strong set of common 
values and identity to form the backbone for society and depends on the state to support 
their development.  Citizens are required to be French first, valuing commitment to the 
society of the Republic above other alliances.  Factionalism or “communautarisme” of 
any kind is to be discouraged in favor of the “universalisme” of the principles of society 
as a whole.  These values, rooted in the philosophical writings of the Enlightenment, lay 
at the heart of the Revolution, whose victory was perceived as a triumph of reason and 
justice over centuries of hierarchy and arbitrary rule by the church-supported monarchy.    
Far from being restricted to the period and circumstances of the Revolution, or 
even France as a whole, however, the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French 
Republic have been viewed as truly universal in nature, or applicable regardless of time 
and place.  This notion of universalism allowed the country to approach its colonial 
ambitions as justified through the idea of a mission civilisatrice, which aimed to bring the 
ideals of the French Revolution to parts of the world seen as less developed.  In fact, 
since the First Republic, the values of the Enlightenment and the Revolution have formed 
the basis of French political identity and thought in many realms.  Even today politicians, 
scholars, and French citizens exhibit a tendency to reach into their political history of 
Enlightenment ideals to justify present conditions and policies.63  For instance, in 
explaining many of today’s controversial policies concerning the banning of headscarves 
and other issues, scholars and politicians alike point to the founding principles of the 
Republic for justification of the country’s seemingly harsh line.  Many scholars and 
politicians refer to Rousseau when explaining political decisions in France, 
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demonstrating the significance and impact of these ideas even today on important 
policies. 
It is important to note, however, that, upon closer examination, one finds many 
instances where these ideas of universalism pivotal to the French national identity and 
politics have themselves been hotly contested and debated throughout the years, casting 
doubt on what many claim to be a strong and established tradition of agreed upon social 
principles.  The tradition of laïcité, endlessly cited as the basis for the often controversial 
French approaches to integration, presents an especially hazy area of Republican values.  
Bowen presents two separate histories of laïcité, which, when used interchangeably to 
justify seemingly contradictory approaches, contribute to much of the confusion 
surrounding the role of religion in France.64  Although many assert that laïcité is a solid 
institution of the French Revolution, its first recorded use is actually not until 1871.65  
During the Revolution, two separate modes of thought towards religion flourished.  The 
first, which can be justified through Rousseau, was the establishment of a civic religion to 
unify the country, whether, as some desired, the Catholic Church or the brief 
revolutionary cult of goddesses of Reason and Freedom.  The second approach 
emphasizes the right of the individual to a freedom of conscience to develop his or her 
own beliefs and to follow these to the extent that they do not disturb public order.  Bowen 
asserts that these two approaches, one enshrining the state’s role in religion, the other 
separating the two realms, have created a pendulum of French policy which swings 
intermittently between the two extremes.   
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This contradiction can be seen even with the laws that are often cited as 
enshrining laïcité. The first, created in 1901, permits the formation of voluntary 
associations and actually aimed to weaken the Catholic Church by requiring religious 
congregations to obtain authorization from the state to operate.  This legal linking of 
church and state was balanced by the passage of a second law in 1905, which, in a 
pluralist spirit, guaranteed freedom of conscience and a right to practice any organized 
religion, while restricting the state from formally recognizing or subsidizing any one 
religion.  The seemingly contradictory requirements of these two laws, one ensuring an 
element of French control over religion and the other guaranteeing its separation from the 
realm of the state, embody the conflicting requirements of laïcité and foreshadow many 
of the complexities of its role in French politics in subsequent years. 
Despite the contradictions and “legal awkwardness” of French concepts of laïcité, 
notions of universalism as a whole thrived throughout successive Republics in France.66 
The ideas of universalism particularly flourished under the Third Republic in the 
nineteenth century. Faced with a country comprised more of a collection of regions than a 
unified nation, the French state sought to solidify Republican values among the 
population by reinforcing a ‘French’ identity where previously there had been merely an 
amalgamation of Bretons, Corsicans, Basques, and others, each with their own history, 
culture and dialect.  The state designed a model to bolster this conceived French identity 
and values through a centralized education system that would make “peasants into 
Frenchmen” through teaching of history and standard French language over regional 
patois, mandatory military service that fostered patriotism and shared experience, and 
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widespread entrance into the workforce.67 While they isolated some rural regional 
populations who struggled to see themselves in the ‘French’ figures described at school, 
these efforts were considered largely successful in creating a universal sense of French 
identity among the wider population and those who entered it.   
In addition to solidifying these values at home, the Third Republic also sought to 
spread them abroad, taking on a mission civilisatrice into the French colonies in Africa 
and Asia.  Here it sought to apply many of the same principles it had used at home to 
integrate the French population, insisting on spreading its standard language and 
education.  Despite the supposed mission civilisatrice to bring Asian and African 
indigènes into the French fold under the umbrella of universalist principles, the act of 
colonization was most often a brutal and oppressive process that went against the very 
ideals that the French were supposedly spreading.  Exploitative labor and ruling systems 
marked the experience of many French colonies, while those who were permitted to 
retain more autonomy in North Africa, or were officially incorporated into the French 
Republic in the case of Algeria, were still treated as subjects rather than citizens of 
France.  
In their effort to show the cracks in the foundation of French universalism, 
Celestin and DalMolin point to several limitations and contradictions that exist from quite 
early on in the conception and application of its ideals.  For example, in this imposition of 
universalist values – in itself a contradiction – in French colonies, supposed citizens of 
the French Republic in Algeria were treated as a distinct indigenous population with 
separate rights from those who were French by birth.  The French colonials also breached 
ideas of laïcité by actively supporting Islam in the Algerian department to facilitate 
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control in the colony, designating family affairs to be regulated by a version of Islamic 
law. Celestin and DalMolin also mention the reinstatement of universal suffrage as a 
quintessential part of Republican values.  However, the restoration of ‘universal’ suffrage 
failed to include women, therefore denying basic rights to one half of the population. 
Finally, the construction of Paris itself as one sees it today with its grand boulevards and 
monuments required the displacing of those on the periphery who did not fit into the 
French model:  what the authors describe as “the backward, the unhealthy, the mad, the 
criminal, the unpatriotic, the provincial, the unclean, and subversive masses.”68 The 
authors point to World War II as the point at which the French universalist model finally 
began to really unravel, however, with the decline of French global influence and the rise 
of alternative universalist models in the consumerism of the United States and Soviet 
communism.     
While this assessment of an ongoing tension between “homogenizing and 
centralizing state” and the various identities and ideologies of the groups within it reflects 
relatively recent circumstances, as Bowen shows, the problems with universalism can be 
traced back to its very conception.  There has never been a definitive explanation of 
republican values or laïcité, but rather a series of French ideas, laws, and precedents that 
have been interpreted in various ways to justify particular approaches and tainted by the 
history of their misuse and violation.  Universalism’s shortcomings have become 
especially apparent today however, with a diverse population of Muslim immigrants and 
the tension surrounding their integration into the French Republic. 
One final idea of Celestin and DalMoulin proves particularly relevant in the 
discussion of Muslims in France, however.  The authors assert in their critique of 
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universalism that the very idea of universalism creates a “dual movement” of assimilation 
and exclusion, or the forming of an “us” and a “them.”  This concept is useful in 
examining today’s climate in which Muslims are often portrayed as a cohesive threat to 
French universalism and republican ideals.  The universalist history in France seems to 
encourage this depiction of Muslim populations as a collective threat to the country’s 
traditional republican values, however, this oversimplifies the situation and arguably 
exacerbates tensions.  The Muslim population as it actually exists in France is far from 
collective and unified, embodying various nationalities, circumstances, and views.  The 
fact of this heterogeneity further complicates ideas of universalism, however, showing 
the various shades of Islam in France and differing ways of integrating the two identities.  
Furthermore, this dual movement tendency in the French case can be especially 
counterproductive, since the insistence on describing Muslim populations as a “them” in 
universalist terms appears to encourage a collective identity where none existed 
previously.  
In the next section I focus on the issue of Muslim immigration and integration 
into France and its illumination of the limits of French universalism.  After giving some 
details as to the composition of the Muslim population, I seek to trace some of the most 
visible signs of this tension and to situate them within the broader idea of the failure of 
the universalist approach.  Finally, I assess the existence of a Muslim collective identity 
and suggest some ways in which the false portrayal of Muslims as a cohesive group 
actually serves to solidify what is now a varied population. 
Muslims in France 
The situation of Muslims in France, as in wider Europe, is often misrepresented.  
The numbers of this population are frequently misreported in a variety of ways, 
depending on one’s political leaning and objective, and it is often implied that Muslims 
are less willing or able to integrate into society than immigrants of other origins, 
suggesting a religious incompatibility with secular French or European culture.  Islam is 
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often depicted as a threatening force, a portrayal which is facilitated by a post 9-11 
climate in which Muslims are seen as potential terrorists.  Most remarkably, perhaps, is 
that Muslims across Europe are seen in these terms as being unified and similar.  Painted 
with large brushstrokes of religion that are tinted by suspicion and blame, they are 
classified as a homogenous and threatening group.  The depicting of this population as a 
cohesive population at all is misleading and unhelpful at best, and counterproductive and 
harmful at worst.  I will discuss some of the implications of this approach below after 
giving an overview of the demographic complexion of Muslim presence in France.  
The Muslim community in France, as elsewhere in Europe, is marked first and 
foremost by its variety. Despite common assumptions and assertions in today’s public 
discussions and media coverage of a uniform invasion of fundamentalist Muslims, the 
French Muslim population lacks homogeneity in nearly every area.  From age to 
socioeconomic status to piety to political views, Muslims in France span a gamut of 
positions that are often reflective of the French wider population.  Nonetheless, some 
commonalities do persist, particularly in struggles against disadvantage and 
discrimination which in turn results in some sense of common identity. The following 
section details the composition of the French Muslim population, its differences, and, 
where possible, some of the overarching trends.  
History 
Muslim movement into France stretches back to the Moors of the eighth century, 
recalling the history of the struggle against the invasion and the French battle at Poitiers, 
but also including some Muslims seeking asylum during the Spanish Inquisition.  
Increased contact with the Muslim world followed during periods of expanding trade and 
then with the French colonization of much of North and West Africa.  The largest 
population of Muslims in France, however, originated with a significant wave of 
immigration following the World Wars, in the wake of an often violent decolonization 
process.  While many Muslims emigrated spontaneously from the former colonies in 
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North Africa, others arrived as recruited workers under programs for reconstruction in 
France.  The presence of the latter group was expected to be temporary, however many 
remained in France beyond the foreseen term of their work, their incorporation into 
French society facilitated by wide employment and the boom of the trente glorieuses.  
With the oil crisis and the economic downturn of the 1970s, however, the government 
ended large-scale labor migration from the Maghreb.  Nonetheless, the Muslim 
population in France continued to grow throughout the 1970s and 80s due to the 
reunification of families.  This wave thus changed the demographics of the French 
Muslim population from mostly adult male to include nuclear and even extended 
families.  Today the French Muslim population is comprised largely of this most recent 
wave of immigrants and increasingly of their descendents, but also includes longstanding 
citizens who immigrated centuries earlier, recent immigrants from other regions of the 
world, and French converts to Islam. 
Demographics   
A few studies have gone into great detail concerning the demographics of Muslim 
populations in France.  This paper draws mainly from a couple of exemplary works, one 
by Jonathan Lawrence and Justin Vaisse and another by Robert Pauly.  A persistent 
problem with demographic studies in France in general, however, is the lack of official 
data. A 1978 law prohibits the collection of data concerning race or ethnicity, designed to 
prevent repetition of the shame of the French compliance in deportation of Jews in the 
Holocaust.  As a result, however, few numbers relevant to Muslims in France exist, and 
those estimates that do circulate often span a wide range of figures that reflect political 
agendas.  Even data concerning naturalization goes uncollected, requiring a creative 
approach to statistics on religious or ethnic groups in France.  Methods of gathering 
statistics include examining numbers of foreign-born populations and their descendants 
and then extrapolating information from percentages from sending countries and 
adjusting for religious diversity.  However, these fail to adequately reflect the increasing 
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number of second and third generation Muslims in France, who constitute a significant 
portion of the population.  Other private groups have attempted to collect religious 
statistics, for example from polling data, however these are generally considered 
inaccurate due to low voter registration among the Muslim population, young average 
age, and a reluctance on the part of French Muslims to declare their religious affiliation in 
polls.69  
Despite the variety of unofficial statistics, most serious estimates put the number 
of Muslims in France at around 5 million.  Figures vary, however, from between 3.6 
million and 6 million, or from about 6 to 10 percent of the French population.  This gives 
France the largest Muslim population in Europe, both in terms of total number and 
percent of the population, with French Muslims accounting for around a third of the total 
Muslim population in Europe. 70 
The ethnic composition and background of the French Muslim population is 
surprisingly diverse.  123 nationalities are represented within this group, bringing a 
variety of cultural and political traditions to the mix. Nearly three quarters of the Muslim 
population hail from the former French colonies in the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia), however, only about half of France’s Muslims are of Arab decent, with the rest 
consisting of Moroccan or Algerian Berbers, immigrants from Turkey, West Africa, or 
Asia, or French converts.  Distinct differences exist between those who have emigrated 
from former colonies and those who hail from other parts of the world, and then again 
between those who are native French.   
Even across national origin, however, many differences remain in history, 
experience, ethnic background, and social and political standing in immigrants’ countries 
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of origin.  For example, an estimated 2 million Muslims have immigrated to France from 
Algeria, which was itself considered part of the French Republic during colonialism.  
This Algerian population, however, while homogenous in nationality of origin and 
distinct from other groups, is quite divided in background even within itself.  One group 
consists of the évolués, who, during the colonial period “evolved” through education and 
assimilation into model colonial subjects.  They were generally privileged elites in 
Algeria, many of whom had studied in France and had held white collar jobs.  This 
population was treated favorably in Algeria by the colonial administrators and enjoyed a 
special relationship with the French state. Another group of Arab and Berber Harkis 
made up the ranks of colonial administrators and soldiers during colonization. This group 
also received exceptional treatment during colonization and collaborated with the French 
during the Algerian War.  Many members of this group immigrated to France during and 
after the Algerian War, despite the disapproval of the French government, in attempt to 
avoid reprisal from the FLN and nationalist Algerians.  Finally, a third group of Algerians 
consists mainly of the previously mentioned laborers recruited in the 1960s.  This group 
comprises most of the Algerian population, who bore the brunt of colonialism but 
nonetheless immigrated to France in search of employment.  Thus, even within this group 
from the same country, Muslim immigrants to France bring different experiences, skills, 
and relationships with and attitudes towards the French state. 
Another divide within the Muslim population tends to fall along a generational 
line. The age distribution of Muslim populations in France is heavily skewed towards the 
young.  Up to one half of the Muslim population is estimated to be under the age of 24, 
with Muslim youth comprising an increasingly large portion of the young French 
population.  Data show that in some parts of the country up to 20 to 30 percent of 
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children are born to immigrant families, the majority of which are Muslim.71  This is 
generally thought to be a result of initially higher fertility rates among immigrant women 
in general, a trend which tends to even out over time spent in France but nonetheless 
fuels fears of a Muslim invasion from within.  Current fertility rates for Maghrebi women 
in France are between 2.5 and 2.9, compared to the 1.9 per French woman, contributing 
to speculation that Muslims could number 8 million by 2020, or approximately 20 
percent of the population.  At a time when fertility rates are on the decline across much of 
Europe this is not entirely unwelcome news, however it fails to consider the tendency of 
Muslim fertility rates to converge with those of French women the longer immigrants 
reside within France, due to perhaps new social norms, costs of living, close quarters, or 
women entering the workforce.72  
The largest populations of Muslims in France reside in the cities of Paris, 
Marseille and Lyon and their suburban outskirts, or banlieues.  The greatest concentration 
of Muslims, about 30 to 40 percent of the total, live in the Ile-de-France region, where 
they make up 10 to 15 percent of the local population.  Another 15 to 20 percent of 
French Muslims live in the southern regions near Marseille and Nice, comprising nearly 
25 percent of the population in Marseille.  Another 15 percent reside in the Lyon-
Grenoble area, with another 5 to 10 percent around Lille.  Several other smaller towns 
also have notably high Muslim populations, including Rubaix in the north, where close to 
50 percent of the population is Muslim.73   
Religion 
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Even within religion, itself the supposedly unifying characteristic assigned to this 
group, there is more variety within the Muslim population (and more similarity with the 
greater French population) than commonly assumed.  Religious observance varies widely 
among Muslims in France along ethnic, national, and generational lines as well as 
personal preference.  Statistics suggest Sub-Saharan Africans to be the most observant 
group, with Algerians being the least pious. Moroccan and Turkish Muslims occupy a 
middle ground in between these two groups when asked to describe their religiosity.   
Ethnicity also has effects on the ways in which Muslims practice their beliefs, although 
not necessarily across national borders.  One survey found that Algerian Berbers are 
twice as likely to engage in Muslim forbidden practices such as eating meat and drinking 
alcohol than their Arab Algerian counterparts, and are more likely to say that they do not 
practice their religion at all.  Moroccan Berbers, on the other hand, are as a group more 
observant than other groups in Morocco.   These figures illustrate just some of the 
differences that exist across this vastly diverse population.  The various ways of 
measuring piety also suggest that different groups hold varying aspects to be of greater 
importance than others. 
Another misconception is that religion plays a significantly greater role in the 
lives of Muslims in France in comparison to the general French population.  In fact, 
among the 5 million Muslims in France, the percentage of those who identify themselves 
as religious or practicing Muslims mirrors almost exactly the corresponding percentage 
of the French Catholic population. Among Muslims, 10 percent say they attend service 
regularly (compared to 9 % of French Catholics), with 5% attending weekly.  Many 
Muslims do report being more pious in private than Catholics do.  A higher percentage of 
Muslims claim to pray regularly (38 percent pray daily compared with 13 % of Catholics) 
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and 80 percent say they fast during Ramadan, although these figures tend to be 
exaggerated.74    Nonetheless, these figures and trends, while useful in countering fears of 
a stark shift in religiosity in France, obscure the many differences in practices, attitudes 




Political leadership presents another realm where divisions within France’s 
Muslim population become quite apparent.  Divisions, usually by nationality, mark the 
lines between various political and social organizations, which have formed to capture 
the assorted political and religious voices of Muslins in France. Muslims of different 
national backgrounds have gained power in different areas, reflecting distinctive 
circumstances and priorities.  Moroccans tend to occupy positions of direction as prayer-
leaders in mosques because of the availability of religious instruction in Morocco. 
Tunisians enjoy leadership in schools and institutes, because many such figures were 
forced to leave by the government during internal debates over the role of Islam in 
Tunisia.  Algerians show higher involvement in political and cultural associations.  Turks 
are especially divided over issues of laïcité in politics because of the Turkish struggle to 
define the role of religion in the public sphere.  Muslims of different nationalities occupy 
different roles within political organizations as well, although these can serve to reinforce 
or cross-cut national divisions.   
The most influential of these Muslim political organizations includes the Great 
Mosque of Paris, which will be discussed in more depth later.  This group, the most 
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closely affiliated with the French government, is known for its moderation and ties to the 
Algerian community, along with other groups that tend toward moderate views.  The 
National Federation of French Muslims (FNMF) began as an alternative to the Paris 
Mosque and is most closely associated with the Moroccan population.  The Union of 
French Islamic Organizations (UOIF), perhaps the most visible organization, pools its 
support from local associations throughout France and is not tied to any one country.  
Other less influential groups include The Coordinating Committee of French Turkish 
Muslims (CCMTF) and the Milli Gorus Islamic movement, which represent the divided 
interests of the Turkish population, which itself is split over the role for religion in state 
matters.  These two organizations tend to align with either the Paris Mosque or the UOIF, 
according to their preferences.  Finally, the French Federation of Islamic Associations of 
Africa, Comoro, and the Antilles (FFAIACA) claims to speak for those Muslims not 
spoken for in the main organizations.  The existence of these groups demonstrates some 
of the large divisions across the French Muslim population, which render it anything but 
cohesive.  Organizations enjoy varying degrees of relationship with the French state, have 
taken different stances on social policies, and promote different views on religious issues.  
Even these generalizable differences across nationalities and political groups must be 
qualified however, since they are also, like many of the divisions listed above, transected 
by others of social class, age, or other distinctions. 
Common Trends and Experience 
 While the many divisions discussed above continue to mark the Muslim 
population in France, some general trends and shared experiences must be mentioned. 
Many of these common themes have implications for identity which will be discussed at 
the end of the chapter.   
 One common situation faced by Muslims in France is an unfavorable economic 
outlook.  The general economic downturn of the 1970s and 80s resulted in the failure of 
an important aspect of the French integration model of the Third Republic: widespread 
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entrance into the workforce. Unemployment rates among French Muslims are generally 
twice as high as those of the overall population and are even higher among young North 
Africans.  In 1999, 22 percent of the foreign-born population was unemployed compared 
with 13 percent of native French.75 Immigrants are overrepresented in blue-collar jobs 
and, even at similar skill levels, they are more likely to be unemployed than the overall 
French population.  In 2002, unemployment rates for those with a college degree were 
twice as high among immigrants (16 percent) than among native French (8 percent). 
These unemployment rates reach even higher levels in younger generations. While native 
French youth under 30 with a high school diploma had an unemployment rate of 15 
percent in 2002, rates reached 32 percent for immigrant youth.  Furthermore, stark 
differences persist in unemployment rates of immigrants from predominantly Muslim 
countries compared with others.  For instance, while Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish 
immigrants experience lower unemployment rates than native French populations, 
immigrants from Africa and Turkey have much higher rates, particularly among youth.  
This is a grave situation, given that half of the Muslim population is under 24 years of 
age.  Unemployment rates for young people from North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Turkey reach dire levels of near 40 percent.  These low employment levels have left 
Muslim immigrants struggling to support families without the assistance of steady 
income as well as to integrate into French society without constant interaction with 
mainstream society.  
 An important factor in these high unemployment rates is discrimination.  
Widespread reports of discrimination abound concerning Muslim populations, 
particularly in the realm of employment.  One study by the International Labor 
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Organization using volunteers impersonating job-seekers revealed that, with all other 
factors being equal, candidates for employment were 3 to 4 times less likely to be called 
for an interview if they had a Muslim name compared to those with traditional French 
ones.  Additionally, the study presents transcriptions of telephone calls that demonstrate 
the blatant discrimination faced by Muslim job seekers on the basis of their religion, 
ethnicity, and neighborhood of residence76.  Similarly, another study by SOS Racisme, an 
antiracism organization in France finds after examining records of two major 
employment agencies that candidates with “non-European” first names were one and a 
half times as likely to be unemployed in every category, with higher levels in fields such 
as sales that require interaction with the public. Other realms of widespread accusations 
of discrimination include arms of the state itself, in run-ins with law enforcement officials 
and the wider legal system.   
The above section shows that, while Muslims in France are geographically 
concentrated in several key areas and often experience overarching trends in population 
growth and challenges to integration, as a body they are quite a diverse group.  Hailing 
from different countries, and ethnicities within those, they bring different attitudes 
towards religion, politics, and the French state, which most often results in internal 
discord rather than unity.  Thus, generalizations about a Muslim invasion or standoff 
cannot accurately reflect the situation in France.   
The French state’s approach to integrating its Muslim population often reflects 
this tendency to mistakenly view the group as homogenous.  Perhaps influenced by a 
universalist predisposition mentioned by Celestin and DalMolin to view society as “us” 
and “them,” the French government, as well as the society and media, have shown an 
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inclination to ignore the variety within the Muslim population, usually in their haste to 
link domestic and international politics, to gain political points, or to exert control over 
the role and direction of religion in France.  The three events detailed below illustrate this 
pattern and demonstrate both the shortcomings of French universalism and one of its 
greatest casualties, the ignored diversity of Muslim populations and the ensuing 
alienation and societal exclusion. 
Examples 
The Role of the Paris Mosque  
One issue that demonstrates both the divergence of interests within the French 
Muslim community and the difficulty of navigating the politics of laïcité and 
universalism is the construction of the Paris Mosque.  Ironically, perhaps the greatest 
symbol of Islam in France, the Grande Mosquée de Paris, was actually conceived and 
constructed by the French state itself, in large part to attempt to control the influence of 
Islam within the state.  The resulting maze of finances and leadership to make this project 
compatible with the laws of 1901 and 1905 exemplifies the blurry lines of laïcité in 
France as well as some of the limits of universalism.  Additionally, the politics over the 
control of the mosque illustrate the extent to which the French Muslim population has 
competing and divergent interests and views within itself. 
 While widespread immigration to France did not begin until after World War II, 
the idea for the Paris Mosque can be traced back to 1895.  The proposal gained traction 
after World War I, when France began to increase its presence in the Middle East after 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire.  The country saw the potential to benefit from its 
relationship with the Arab world and attempted to garner support among Arab 
nationalists in order to compete with British predominance in the region and establish 
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itself as a “great Muslim power.”77  The state encouraged Muslims in French controlled 
lands to pilgrimage to Mecca to increase French presence in the holy lands.78 The mosque 
project, intended to bolster France’s sway in the Muslim world, also gained more support 
following the war as a way to also display the country’s gratitude to the 100,000 North 
African Muslims who lost their lives in World War I and to demonstrate the possibility of 
a peaceful coexistence between Islam and France.  At this time, the French state also saw 
another benefit in controlling the mosque project in that it would be more capable of 
molding the growing Muslim presence in France.  This longstanding desire to have a 
French-controlled symbol of Islam exemplifies the French approach towards the religion 
and its adherents and reflects the persistent tension within the strands of laïcité.   
The logistics of erecting a state-funded religious building in the heart of the laïque 
French capital proved challenging but not impossible.  The French state organized a 
‘Society of Pious Trusts and Islamic Holy Places’ in Algiers, which was at this time 
within a department of France, and charged the organization with creating a Muslim 
Institute in Paris that would become the Paris Mosque.  Since the 1905 law prohibited the 
state from financing religious activities, the government ensured that the Institute would 
also include other features such as a restaurant, conference rooms, a library, a bath, and 
other features to qualify it as a cultural institute.  At this point, the Society of Pious Trusts 
and Islamic Holy Places moved to Paris and occupied the space secured for it by the 
state.  This legal finagling in creating private non-religious organizations to handle the 
construction of a religious institution shows the grey areas surrounding laïcité and the 
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determination of the state to walk a fine line between simultaneously controlling religion 
and separating itself from it.     
Construction for the Grande Mosquée de Paris officially began in 1922 as a public 
and political affair to showcase France’s amicable relationship with the Muslim world.  
The Mosque’s varied relationship with different sectors of the Muslim community, 
however, serves to illustrate the extent to which divisions exist within this population in 
France.  Moroccan influence played a substantial role throughout the construction, which 
began with a representative of the Moroccan Sultan laying the building’s cornerstone and 
which continued under the direction of Moroccan résident-général and foreign minister, 
Maréchal Lyautey, and featured the work of Moroccan artisans.  The dedication of the 
Mosque in 1926 was jointly attended by the French President and the Moroccan Sultan.  
However, representatives other countries also worked to influence this important symbol 
of Islam in France.  Ties to Algeria were also deeply rooted with the Mosque’s origin in 
the Society of Pious Trusts and Islamic Holy Places in Algiers and Algerian Abdelkader 
ben Ghabrit directing the Mosque until he died in 1954.  After Abdelkader’s death, 
control of the Mosque fell under competition among Muslims of Moroccan, Tunisian, 
and Algerian backgrounds.  Most attendees were Algerians, however, who, particularly 
after independence, fought to retain control of the Paris Mosque. Despite a persistent 
battle for control, the Paris Mosque for now remains mostly a representative of the 
Algerian community and a more moderate voice controlled by the government. 
While the Paris Mosque still occupies a strong role, albeit influenced by the state, 
in French politics, the French state continued to try to unify the Muslim population 
behind a single organization that would interface with the government concerning 
important issues of relevance to Muslims. Two major efforts to create a political Muslim 
council failed to form a cohesive body, due to the role given to the Paris Mosque over 
other groups of French Muslims, before a notorious effort, led by then Interior Minister, 
Nicolas Sarkozy, succeeded in forming the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) 
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in 2003.  This organization was intended to give a collective voice to Muslims in France 
in political matters, on par with the Catholic Bishops Conference, the Protestant 
Federation of France, and the Jewish Consistory, which have negotiated issues of 
religious concern with the state for centuries.79 Sarkozy’s success in forming the Council, 
however, was not without struggle.  Control over the council was and is an issue of hot 
debate within the Muslim community, whose diverse interests and views cannot be 
entirely represented by a single body.  A “seemingly endless struggle for power among 
the various associations” finally ended with the three most powerful groups, the UOIF, 
the Paris Mosque, and the FNMF agreeing to the demands of the state for the selection of 
its preferred moderate leader, Algerian Dalil Boubakeur in exchange for guaranteed vice 
presidencies for the other two associations.80 Invitations for elections to the body of the 
CFCM were extended to mosques with electoral lists tied to national origin, showing the 
importance of divisions of national lines in these issues.   
The example of the Paris Mosque and its role in the CFCM shows the extent to 
which politics and religion are actually melded in France and the lengths to which the 
state will go to influence the direction of religion in France.  That the French political 
system contains, and indeed encouraged the creation of, a political body in which 
religious organizations play a key role demonstrates clearly France’s willingness to 
negotiate the supposedly foundational concepts of laïcité in its desire to control the 
expression of Islam within the state. The very acknowledgement of the existence of a 
Muslim community at all goes against the French universalist presupposition that all 
citizens of the Republic are equal and French without regard to religious or ethnic 
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background. French politicians have made efforts to sidestep this contradiction by 
asserting that the CFCM is not a body to represent the Muslim “community” so much as 
a “Muslim component of French society,” however this distinction is quite weak.81  The 
Council was designed to represent the interests of a group, which must constitute some 
form of community separate from France if it requires a voice with which to speak 
separately to the French government.  While the efforts to put the Muslim community on 
par with other established religions through the creation of a political body seems fair and 
practical, it also shows a willingness to work around the laws behind laïcité.   
Also evident in the process of establishing the Paris Mosque and the CFCM is 
France’s attempt to gain control over the direction of Islam in France through the 
selection of leaders whose ideas are compatible with those of the French government.  
Ironically, however, the state’s efforts to promote leadership often result in the 
delegitimizing of the elements the state wishes to support.  Boubakeur, after being chosen 
as leader of the CFCM, saw his credibility crumble in the eyes of Muslims, as he was 
seen as a puppet of the state. The very idea of the French government appointing leaders 
for the population harkens back to colonial practices, where the French would select 
regional rulers to govern in the colonies.  In this case, Sarkozy ironically hand picked the 
leaders to the CFCM with the consultation of the governments of the countries from 
which they had come, adding another dimension to the complicated scheme of Muslim 
politics. 
Overall, however, the creation of the CFCM illustrates two ongoing themes in the 
relationship between Muslims and the state: firstly, that the Muslim community, far from 
being the cohesive invading force of the media portrayals, has plenty of its own internal 
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divisions, and secondly, that the French state walks an often contradictory line that is 
typical of its history laïcité, alternating between wanting to control and separate itself 
from religion. 
The Headscarf Affair – Rights or Repression? 
The question of headscarves in France presents another controversial point of 
interaction between Muslims and the state in France that demonstrates the heterogeneity 
of the Muslim population.  The law banning headscarves in schools resulted from several 
rounds of very public debate that each reflected the political climate of its time.   The 
seemingly increasing Islamic component of international crises led many to portray 
Muslims in France as a part of this broader context. The eventual law banning the voile in 
school had little to do with scarves themselves, but reflected the ongoing French concern 
with symbolism, identity, and human rights in this international context, as well as a 
continued reluctance to acknowledge the nuances and complexity of the Muslim 
population and its circumstances. 
That these events in France unfolded within the context of schools comes as no 
surprise.  Schools in France have long been the realm of the state as formative places of 
creating French identity and citizenship and have grown into symbols of French 
Republicanism itself.  This importance, both practical and symbolic, of French schools 
has long been understood by those who have sought to influence them over the years.  
Schools served as the grounds for battles over the role of the Catholic Church throughout 
the years, as well as other religions, and fittingly they became the backdrop for one of the 
state’s most public and controversial confrontations with Islam. 
The domestic and international political environment of the 1980s and 90s set a 
background of tension that directly shaped the interpretation of the headscarf dilemma 
and the conversation surrounding it.  In France, radical right wing parties such as Jean 
Marie Le Pen’s Front National, which tended to blame immigrants for France’s economic 
woes, were gaining influence against François Mitterand’s Socialist government.  
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International political events, such as Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Salmon 
Rushdie for the publication of his Satanic Verses as well as the formation of the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria as an Islamic alternative to the socialist democracy in 
place since independence bolstered the success of such parties by creating an 
international climate of increased conflict between Muslims and the West. Fundamental 
Islam seemed to be gaining power on the world stage and fears grew that this movement 
would enter France through its own Muslim population.   
Thus, tensions were already high in September, 1989, when three girls, two sisters 
of Moroccan decent and one girl of Tunisian roots, arrived at their middle school in Creil, 
outside of Paris, in Islamic dress.  Class photos show that this was not the first time that 
students had worn scarves to school, but with increased public consciousness of Islamic 
confrontations this instance drew much controversy.  The principal expelled the students 
after they refused to remove the headscarves, on the grounds that they infringed upon the 
laïcité of the public school space.  The situation soon erupted into a national incident that 
evoked strong reactions across the board.  Most religious organizations called for more 
negotiations (Paris Mosque, Arab League, the Vatican), while others, fearing a 
crackdown on all religions, called for acceptance of scarves (Danielle Mitterand, various 
Muslim organizations, the chief rabbi of France, the secretary of the Teaching League) 
and many other teachers stood firm on a narrow and strict interpretation of laïcité.  
Foreign governments weighed in as well, with the Moroccan government publicly asking 
the parents of the Moroccan students to send the girls to school without the scarves.  The 
Tunisian government, however, refused to get involved and the other young girl was 
expelled. 
The State Council heard the case and, citing the French Constitution and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, declared that the girls had a right to wear the 
scarves as long as they did not disturb school life. The Council suggested that religion 
itself was not incompatible with laïcité as long as it did not include ostentatious 
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propaganda or proselytism that disturbed teaching.  This remained the message for a 
while, with the State Council finding for the rights of students who sued schools in 41 out 
of 49 cases, unless the school could prove the existence of danger or excessive 
proselytism. 
The headscarf issue reemerged, however, in 1993-94, with even more controversy 
over two instances of veiled girls.  The first involved another two girls who refused to 
remove their scarves during their gym class in a school near Lyon.  In this case, teachers 
mobilized against the presence of scarves, organizing a strike and asserting that the voile 
was physically and symbolically dangerous in school as a tool of segregation.  When two 
radical Muslim preachers stated publically that the scarf was a requirement for Muslim 
girls, many protested the inherent discrimination and subjugation that the scarf 
represented. These comments seemed to justify spreading fears of fundamentalism, 
fueling speculation that the scarves signified a real threat to France’s universalist 
republican values of both individual rights and laïcité.  
Another case in Grenoble, however, showed a different side of the headscarf 
controversy, suggesting another symbolism of the voile.  In this case, a girl in her final 
year of high school had begun wearing the scarf as a symbol of her own personal 
embrace of Islam, and, when she was expelled, began protesting outside of the high 
school with a 22-day hunger strike.  In this instance the scarf became not a tool of 
repression, but rather an avenue for asserting individual identity and political rights. 
Despite the complexity of Muslim identity displayed by these two instances of the 
voile, the government response in 1994 was even more resolutely opposed, reflecting the 
escalated fears of radical Islam due to wider political developments.  Since the first 
incident in 1989, the situation in Algeria had erupted into a full-scale conflict and the 
FIS, after being denied an electoral victory, had been replaced by the even more radical 
and violent Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA).  Many of these members were former 
mujahedeen from Afghanistan who represented the pinnacle of what France feared would 
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enter its society.  There was a perception of an all out culture war in France, with 
immigration debates coming before the National Assembly and international events 
interpreted as linked to domestic concerns.  In 1994, Education Minister François Bayrou 
banned all ostensible religious signs from schools. Over 100 students were expelled 
under this directive, with some teachers directly citing their desire to prevent the Algeria 
situation from permeating France.  
By the time of the third headscarf incident in 2002-3, the awareness of domestic 
social problems linked with Muslim populations had grown enormously, leading many to 
link international crises with growing domestic unrest.  An official report in 2000 from 
the High Council on Integration denounced the expulsion of covered girls on the basis 
that this hindered integration of Muslims into French society and would foster 
communitarianism by driving girls home to radical families and private religious schools 
that would arise to accommodate them.  However, a growing and very vocal minority 
called for a total ban on the scarves, and when, in 2002, another girl was expelled for 
wearing a scarf in a school outside of Lyon, this minority grew.  There was a sense that 
something had to be done to stop the progression of the “Muslim problem,” both 
domestically and abroad.  Teachers at this school protested and went on strike citing 
laïcité and solidifying this as the basis by which the scarves would be opposed.    
Many figures in the debate played on widespread public fears of fundamentalist 
Islam to further their own agendas. While speaking in front of the UOIF on the eve of the 
presidential elections, Nicolas Sarkozy launched a new headscarf debate aimed at 
garnering support by fanning the growing fear and controversy. Other politicians also 
mobilized around the issue as a way to criticize the left for having abandoned Republican 
principles in favor of multiculturalism or in hopes of pulling support from far right. The 
media also capitalized on the public’s fears, publishing story after story detailing the 
horrors of fundamental Islam and thereby implying links between scarves in France and 
oppressive fundamentalist regimes around the world.  This helped to create a sense that 
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the headscarves were inherently un-French in their repression and symbolized a greater 
threat of a coming fundamentalist challenge. A poll in 2003 found that 49 percent of 
those polled supported a ban on scarves in school compared to 45 percent who were 
opposed.  Most who agreed with a ban based their opposition to the scarf in its role in 
lowering the status of women, and few mentioned the importance of laïcité.  Bowen 
suggests that the banning of scarves became a tangible way of protesting and fighting 
fundamental Islam intended in much the same way that the New York crackdown on 
graffiti worked to reduce serious crime.82  Others asserted the need of a law to clarify 
laïcité and the role of religion in the modern republic, while religious leaders claimed that 
a ban would open a Pandora’s box of religious antagonism.   
Another incident in a school in Aubervilles led President Chirac to announce, in 
July, 2003, the formation of the Independent Commission of Reflection on the 
Application of the Principle of Laïcité in the Republic, known more commonly as the 
Commission on Laïcité or the Stasi Commission after its president, Bernard Stasi.  The 
commission was convened to examine issues of laïcité with a focus on the role of the 
voile.  Comprised of a diverse group of figures involved in the debate, the Commission 
looked into many areas of laïcité including the role of social problems in exacerbating the 
situation of Muslims, the possibility of an amendment to the 1905 to finance religious 
buildings, new ways of teaching laïcité in school, and the role of the CFCM.  In the end 
the Commission came out in favor of a law banning all ostensible signs of religion, with 
18 votes for and one abstention.  Most commissioners justified their finding saying that 
things in schools had gotten out of hand and something had to be done, although most 
showed uncertainty that a law would make a real difference.  The Commission made 
                                                 
 
 
82 Bowen, John R. Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves; Islam, the State, and Public Space. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) 
 56 
plenty of other recommendations as well, from alleviating poverty, to battling 
discrimination, to allowing Jewish and Muslim holidays, although they frequently 
reported that the only recommendation taken to heart was the headscarf ban. The public 
supported the decision, however, with a new poll by the same group, BVA, finding that 
72 percent favored the ban, up from 49 before the Commission.83 
Important to note with the Stasi Commission is the lack of representation of those 
who actually wore scarves, as the Commission failed to interview either girls who had 
been expelled or sociologists that had studied the phenomenon.  Only one veiled woman 
came before the Commission, and little was said to gain her perspective on the issues at 
stake.  In looking into whether the voile was a tool of oppression incompatible with 
French laïcité and universalism, the Commission, and indeed the wider public, ignored 
many of the nuances of the veil and the women who wore it. Nicolas Sarkozy, himself 
not known for treading lightly around issues with the Muslim community, remarked 
about being approached by covered women after his testimony in front of the Stasi 
Commission that “I was struck by the fact that many of them were at university, were 
born in France, and why then the need to caricature their identity? It is because they see 
their identity caricatured in the eyes of others.”84  
This oversight demonstrates the extent to which France overlooked and arguably 
continues to avoid the diversity within the Muslim community.  The attention given by 
the government, the media and the public to international issues with fundamental Islam 
overshadowed the French women whom the law would actually impact and the many 
reasons these women have for wearing head coverings.  The individual cases themselves 
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show the many reasons for adorning the voile.  While some girls came from families who 
encouraged the covering of their heads, others, such as the young woman in Grenoble, 
adopted the headscarf of their own volition as a symbol of protest and provocation rather 
than one of submission.  The final case leading to the law shows another variation of the 
veil.  These girls, Alma and Lila Lévy, came from a diverse family.  Their father, an 
atheist French Jew, was the leader of the Movement against Racism and for Friendship 
among Peoples, while their mother was from Algeria, although she herself had never 
worn a voile.  The girls’ independent choice to gradually embrace Islam and adopt the 
veil initially irritated their father, who said he spoke with them of the burden posed by the 
veil in Muslim countries.  However the girls said that they understood and would never 
wear it in a country where it was required.  Clearly in this case the veil did not represent 
oppression, but rather a voluntary embrace of a part of the girls’ identity and an assertion 
of their right to choose to embrace this aspect. Ironically, in this case and others like it, 
the very symbol of oppression designed to make women blend invisibly into a repressive 
society was used by French women to stand out and powerfully negotiate their own 
identity. 
Other studies have confirmed this varied pattern of behavior in groups of women who 
wear the scarf, although of course many different types of circumstances exist.  Two 
sociologists, Françoise Gaspard and Farhad Khosrokhavar, found in 1993-94, after 
interviewing many women who wore the veil, that there were a few main streams of 
behavior.85  They found that one group of women tended to wear the scarf to appease 
their parents as they transitioned into adulthood and usually abandoned it later in life.  
Others adopted the scarf independently of their families during high school or afterwards 
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to suit their own identity.  These women tended to be well educated and successful and 
embraced the veil as a component of the Islam of their choosing.  A final group consisted 
of those who had immigrated to France and had worn some form of head covering all 
their lives.  All of the women in the study spoke of their dress as a choice, and none 
claimed any affiliation with fundamentalist groups.  Thus, as seen in these examples, the 
headscarf often represents to women, not always a symbol of oppressive Islam in another 
part of the world, but rather a manner of negotiating an identity in France that reconciles 
their background and their current circumstances.  
The response to the passage of the headscarf law was equally marked by a diversity 
of reactions. Muslim organizations fell on various sides of the debate that often reflected 
their general role in French politics.  The Paris Mosque and other moderates, as well as 
most Turkish and Sub-Saharan Africans, generally supported the Republican line. The 
CFCM struggled with its own response due to internal disagreements and thus said little 
publicly, while the UOIF came out forcefully against the ban and attempted to organize a 
strong objection.  Three major demonstrations took place in Paris, with opposition to the 
law being the only thing that many participants shared.  In attendance were Marxist 
groups with no support for religion specifically but who called for class solidarity and 
antiracism, women’s rights groups, protestors against homelessness and other issues, and 
Muslim men and women of many backgrounds.  The latter group portrayed themselves 
not as angry immigrants, but as citizens of France protesting for the universal right to 
attend school.  While most attendees were women, few wore scarves. 
This variety, in reasons for wearing the scarf, in levels of support for the ban, and in 
response to the law, reflects the overall diversity of the Muslim population and suggests 
the error of portraying Muslim women and their circumstances as uniform. The unfolding 
of the headscarf affair demonstrates this dangerous tendency to generalize Muslims in 
France in terms of conflicts involving Muslims in other parts of the world, where French 
Muslims themselves acknowledge no connection.  Whereas the French media, politicians, 
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and public made quick leaps from the Algerian civil war to scarves in schools, French 
Muslims viewed themselves with much more nuance.  In fact, many used the resources 
and traditions of France to contest the law via strikes, protests, and legal routes.  This 
shows a more sophisticated interpretation of Islam and its requirements and role in 
France on the part of Muslims than the wider French population, who tended to see 
Muslims as cohesive and threatening. 
The controversy also illustrates a mistakenly black and white interpretation of laïcité 
and universalism that ignores the historical complexity of these ideas in France.  For 
example, the Catholic Church historically played a role in schools that was not neatly 
navigated throughout French history.  Additionally, when the definition and role of public 
space became relevant in the debate, it quickly became clear that this concept, along with 
broader ideas of laïcité, had not been sufficiently clarified. Furthermore, what established 
guidelines and precedents for laïcité did exist in France, while they have suited the 
tradition of Judeo-Christian practice fairly well, do not fit so easily the Islamic tradition.  
If the size of a symbol is the basis by which is it deemed appropriate, the universalism of 
the French Republic seems trivial and unprepared to operate in a Muslim context where 
larger objects such as scarves are important. 
The headscarf affair further demonstrates France’s desire to control the direction of 
Islam within the state. In its reaction to international developments, the French 
government prioritized some manner of action to prevent this form of Islam from 
developing within it.   It thus walked a traditionally complicated line of playing the laïcité 
laws off of each other.  While the French government used the 1905 law to outlaw the 
presence of scarves in schools, it also acted in line with the tendency of the 1901 law to 
assert control over the variety of religion practiced within the country.  While this 
upholds France’s tradition of wanting to mold young French into model citizens of the 
Republic through solidifying within them the traditional Enlightenment values of equality 
and reason, it also reflects its tendency to manipulate religion to reach this end.  This 
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shows an effort on the part of the government to encourage the creation of what some 
have termed an Islam de France, or an Islam specific to France, rather than simply Islam 
en France, or Islam in France.86 
 
2005 Riots: Emerging of a Common Identity? 
Perhaps the most notorious recent event that has brought the question of Muslim 
integration to the forefront of public consciousness both in France and around the world 
has been the riots of 2005.   These visible and violent eruptions of mostly Muslim youth 
in the banlieues have been interpreted in a variety of ways, from an extension of political 
turmoil in the Middle East,87 to class struggle, to a response to police brutality,88 to proof 
that Muslim populations are actually incompatible with France,89 to, as the government 
concluded, a cry for an acknowledgement and addressing of the discrimination and 
inequality faced by Muslim populations.  Regardless of interpretation, the riots seemed to 
offer a confirmation of the existence of a uniform Muslim identity captured by the 
simultaneous mobilization of groups around the country around a common concern. 
The events have also been misinterpreted, particularly in the United States, as 
having a strong racial or religious tint.  The riots did not involve a representative portion 
of the Muslim population in France and indeed involved many other groups.  In fact, 
there was little to suggest a common religious or ethnic component at all.  Rather, rioters 
converged around what presents the strongest aspect of what could be considered a 
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shared identity: common experiences of youth in the banlieues. This event demonstrates 
that, while the Muslim population is diverse and hardly generalizable, the banlieues 
themselves have begun to offer a real challenge to the French universalist claim.     
The actual events that set off the rioting remain somewhat shrouded in mystery.  
Police reports claim that the officers involved apprehended a group of young boys after 
receiving a call about some adolescents stealing equipment from a construction storage 
area in Clichy-sous-Bois, near Paris.  The boys themselves, as well as some of the 
neighborhood residents, claim that the police had approached the boys while they were 
returning from a soccer game and that they had fled out of fear of a lengthy interrogation.  
Whatever the pretense, however, six youth were apprehended by police around 6pm on 
October 27, 2005, while three others escaped capture by scaling a fence to hide in an 
electric turbine station.  As they hid, two of these young boys were electrocuted to death 
inside the station, while the third escaped badly burned.   
Many people blamed the deaths of the boys on the routinely harsh treatment by 
the police, which many claimed had caused the supposedly innocent boys to flee rather 
than talk with the officers.  The general state of poor relations between the government 
and the largely Muslim populations of the banlieues had already been deteriorating for 
quite some time, and with this incident reached a breaking point. What followed 
illustrates the levels of frustration and dissatisfaction that exceeded what many in France 
had previously considered.  Riots broke out in Clichy-sous-Bois that gradually spread to 
cities throughout France.  Anger at the injustice of the boys’ deaths mixed with 
longstanding frustrations at the treatment of the underclass populations of the suburbs to 
produce the most destructive riots since the events of 1968. Over the course of the 
following 20 days, rioting spread to 274 towns across France, claiming the lives of two 
people and injuring countless others, including 126 police and firefighters.  An estimated 
200 million Euros of damage was incurred, including the burning of nearly 10,000 
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vehicles and several buildings, and resulted in the arrest of 2,888 people. On November 
8, 2005, President Chirac declared a state of emergency and imposed curfews. 
Given the widespread participation in the riots across the entire country, a crack in 
French universalism seemed apparent.  For weeks, thousands of young people 
collectively rose up in anger against the larger state.  Despite their massive scale and the 
widespread participation in them, however, the riots in 2005 were surprising in that they 
had no real leadership or structure.  No demands were made on the government by 
leaders of the communities in flames.  In fact, the largely Muslim banlieue communities 
themselves were generally very concerned with ending the riots, since it was their 
property that was being destroyed.  Participants in the rioting consisted mainly of young 
males, divided generally according to neighborhood rather than by religion or ethnicity.  
Despite assertions of a religious component,90 not all rioters were Muslim and, in fact, 
many clerics came forth and publicly called for an end to the violence.91  Rioters did not 
respond to the wishes of the religious leaders, however, suggesting, not only that the 
events were not driven by religious motivation, but also that the words of the religious 
leadership did not carry much weight with the perpetrators.  Also surprising, given the 
way that the riot’s depiction centered on the high immigrant populations of the 
communities, was the fact that 92 percent of those arrested were French citizens.92 
What the rioters did mobilize around, however, was the exclusionary social 
structure and widespread discrimination and racism that denied them access to economic 
mobility and justice.  As Hargreaves points out, the violence during the riots focused on 
burning cars, which symbolized the upward mobility that seemed so off limits to the 
banlieue youth, as well as police forces that represented the discrimination and 
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humiliation they faced from the French state and society.93  In rising up collectively, the 
marginalized communities of young people in the banlieues actively drew unavoidable 
attention to their situation, moving the periphery of the cities where they had been 
ostracized to the center of the country, and even the world’s, awareness. 
The 2005 riots were certainly not the first in France, however, and not the first 
involving these communities.  Riots had intermittently shaken French cities to a smaller 
degree throughout the previous decades. Cesari claims that the 2005 round increased in 
intensity because of a decrease in government involvement in the banlieues.94  She points 
to the resources that the government had channeled to ‘beur’ organizations, through 
money, education, and social workers during the 1970s and 80s as resulting in an 
increased state presence in the banlieues that kept these communities linked to wider 
French society.  Now she claims that the state presence has declined, leading to a 
growing disconnect between the beur leaders tied to the government and the swelling 
population of discontented youths, who are easily driven to violence by issues such as 
police brutality.  
This disconnect between the government and the population of the banlieues 
appears to be increasing and contributing to the sense of hopelessness among the people 
who live there. Even before the riots, there were an estimated 150 “no-go zones” within 
France, or areas into which French police refuse to venture without major 
reinforcements.95  This situation of tension and hostility at the absence of the state 
exacerbates fears on both sides and leads to a sense that those within the banlieues have 
been abandoned by the government.   
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Lessons from these Examples: Is there a Muslim Identity in France? 
The preceding demographic information and analysis of significant events in the 
relationship between Muslims and the state in France suggest that at this point in time a 
collective and unified Muslim identity does not exist.  Muslims in France remain quite 
divided across many facets of identity ranging from country of origin, ethnicity, political 
views, generational lines, religious leanings, and other characteristics.  As seen with 
examples of the Paris Mosque and the CFCM, unifying a Muslim voice behind either 
religion or politics has proven to be impossible.  This is to be expected, given Amartya 
Sen’s insistence on human beings as multi-faceted creatures simultaneously embodying 
many identities.  To reduce this population to a single “Muslim” label would be to ignore 
the many other factors at play and to minimize the people in question.  The example of 
the headscarf affair suggests that assertions of a common identity by French media, 
politicians, and others have been premature and have likely been influenced by unrelated 
outside events.  Furthermore, the identity ascribed to Muslims through these sorts of 
situations has been largely negative and, combined with high profile laws such as the 
banning of the veils, has contributed to a stigmatization of Muslim populations. 
 This leads to a second point that, while no strong common identity exists now 
within Muslim populations in France, there is evidence to suggest that one could develop 
in the future, and in fact may be encouraged by the public’s insistence on religion as a 
negative and characterizing feature.  While older generations of Muslim immigrants 
tended to gradually adopt a more secular “French” outlook over the course of their 
residence, increasingly, younger generations are identifying themselves more exclusively 
by their religion.  This can be seen as a way of negotiating a difficult mixed identity in 
France, but it is also likely in response to the insistence on labeling this group based on 
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their religious beliefs.  Vaisse and Lawrence report a finding that young Muslim students 
today claim an “increased personal identification with Islam” compared to those of earlier 
generations.96  A surprising one third of Muslim students polled said they felt most 
defined by their religious group, much more than by their skin color (10 percent) or 
where they lived (9 percent).  Only 4 percent of non-Muslims reported this strong 
religious identity, feeling their identities to be much more tied to gender (24 percent), and 
place of residence (27 percent). 97 The authors attribute this emphasis on religion to a 
reflection of the way students feel they are classified by their peers and their society. 
Thus, the portrayal of a cohesive Muslim population could ironically turn into 
something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.  While the diverse population shares little in 
common in reality, constant assumptions of its homogeneity by the wider population may 
actually create a sense of shared identity where one did not exist before.  Vaisse and 
Lawrence mention this in their assessment of Islam in France, directly citing efforts such 
as the creation of the CFCM as putting an emphasis on religion rather than on the 
workers groups or civic organizations that characterized past generations’ relationship 
with the state.98  With the connection made for them from their background to Islam by a 
societal insistence on religion, many embrace Islam as a part of their heritage, ironically 
turning to the global version of the religion that France fears rather than the “family 
Islam” of their parents. 99   
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Also tied to this growth of Muslim religiosity are many of Amartya Sen’s ideas 
about identity.  Sen asserts that a facet of identity tends to increase in importance in the 
face of persecution.  Thus, Muslims in France could experience a greater pull towards 
their religion as they perceive its disregard in society.  This is certainly possible given the 
negative values, stereotypes, and associations attributed to Islam during the debates and 
coverage of the events described above.  For instance, Vaisse and Lawrence credit a spike 
in religiosity among Muslims after 9/11 to the sharp rise in anti-Muslim sentiment that 
followed the attacks. Others have likewise anticipated this result of stigmatizing Muslims 
during the controversial French debates.  During the headscarf debate Nicolas Sarkozy 
argued against a new headscarf law during his term as Interior Minister for a similar 
reason that it would only serve to humiliate Muslims and radicalize both sides of the 
debate.100  The tendency seen above to link Muslims in France with Muslims in wider 
global conflicts also harmfully contributes to ideas of Islam in society, perpetuating a 
negative image of French Muslims.  One young Muslim woman claimed to be able to tell 
when something negative had occurred involving Muslims in the world simply by the 
way people would look at her at any given day on the metro.101  These harmful 
perceptions, mixed with a continued ‘minimization’ of Muslims in France to their 
religious persuasion could thus contribute to a growing sense of unity among the 
population, in effect creating what has been wrongly identified as common Muslim 
identity in society. 
For now however, the closest thing to a common identity among French Muslims 
is not one of Islam, but rather of the banlieues themselves, as demonstrated in the 2005 
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riots.  While the Muslim population could not come together to agree on important 
religious, social, or political issues, many of its youth, along with others in the banlieues 
around France, showed an element of cohesion, albeit not to the extent portrayed by 
some, in response to a perceived act of discrimination. This suggests what some describe 
as a growing identity of the banlieues. This identity is not based in ethnic or religious 
heritage but rather in a shared experience of discrimination, poverty, and stigmatization 
by a France that views them as a threat, as well as a distinct culture developing in the 
isolation of the banlieues.   
The banlieues have seen a developing culture of their own in the absence of 
French or North African cultural influences.  With immigrants from such a variety of 
places and backgrounds as shown above, the communities of the banlieues exhibit little 
of any one foreign culture.  Furthermore, these suburbs are increasingly filled with 
second and third generation French Muslims who, while they feel ties to their 
background, especially in light of discrimination against it, have never lived outside of 
France.  Traditional French culture, however, is also largely absent from these areas. 
Isolated geographically in the periphery of large cities, populations in the banlieues exist 
in what Cesari terms a ‘cultural void.’  Marked by characterless buildings and poor 
transportation, the banlieues lack the cafes, shops, and cultural spaces that normally 
pervade the traditional French landscape and exemplify the French experience.  They 
thus have few physical or symbolic links to traditional French life. In the absence of 
either French or North African culture, the communities of the banlieues have developed 
many of their own social norms and behaviors.   
 Banlieue culture exists in a variety of realms, including social structure, music, 
language, and attitude. The absence of community structures and symbols has left a hole 
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in this area filled by the rising population of youth, who themselves are often the 
providers of local social rules, “based on aggressive manhood, control of the streets, 
defense of a territory.”102 Disappointed and disenchanted with the system that seems to 
have abandoned them, the youths destroy the very symbols of failed social mobility, 
including schools, welfare offices, and other public buildings, and promote a culture of 
antagonism towards the state. Many scholars have made the comparison between 
banlieue culture and that of American ghettos.  In fact, when Hollywood movies are 
dubbed into French, a banlieue accent is typically given to African American characters, 
furthering this link between the two cultures.103 The banlieues have likewise influenced 
the music scene in France.  For example, rai music, which mixes Western and Arab 
influences, originated in the banlieues and later became quite popular in wider France.  
Additionally, the banlieues have exerted a large influence on language with the 
emergence of verlan, or a type of slang originally specific to these neighborhoods which 
has since spread to mainstream culture.  By inverting syllables to create their own words, 
youths of the cités have been able to further their own subculture within France in a very 
traditional way.  These cultural aspects are cemented by a sense of community in 
opposition to the French state, which many youths view as abandoning or even 
persecuting their banlieue population.  
 Some such as Cesari have painted these tendencies and others as a way of 
reclaiming a positive identity out of a negative one assigned by society at large. In 
addition to the discrimination of a Muslim identity, many face judgment based on their 
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neighborhood of residence.104 Public incendiary remarks have also fueled this perception, 
such as the infamous line given by Nicolas Sarkozy, when he vowed as Interior Minister 
to rid the banlieues of racailles, or scum, even if he had to use a power hose.105 With this 
perception of persecution, a banlieue identity arguably, according to Sen, gains salience 
in the eyes of these youths.  Feeling an increased attachment to this identity, many strive 
to reclaim it as a positive quality.  Thus, through exclusive vocabulary, unique styles of 
music, and defiant attitudes towards police, the banlieue communities assert a degree of 
positive common identity in opposition to mainstream society.  Ironically, however, this 
created identity occasionally spills over into the wider community, resulting in the 
adoption of certain verlan terms into general vocabulary and the growing popularity of 
music styles originating in the banlieues.    
While these common circumstances of the French Muslim population are perhaps 
not enough to form a concrete shared identity or an imagined community, they do suggest 
a strong challenge to French ideas of universalism.  In a sense, France continues to fight 
against the same signs of communautarisme that it has in the past.  The use of verlan in 
the banlieues as a dialect of a specific culture harkens back to the struggle of the Third 
Republic to stamp out regional identities by eliminating patois dialects.  Universalism 
thus continues to fight the same sorts of battles against communities within it, be they 
regional, religious, ethnic, or community-based. Unfortunately, many of the things which 
might help to navigate a blended identity and address the identity void question, such as 
the teaching of Maghrebi history and language in schools, would also likely undermine 
many ideas of laïcité and universalism.   
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Does this challenge to universalism render the French model obsolete?  It seems a 
catch-22 to suggest that the preservation of a system would require the violating of its 
basic principles, however there is perhaps room for progress.  The government appears to 
have taken note of the gravity of the situation, even if it has not handled it in the most 
tactful of ways, given the unfolding of the current controversial identity debate.  In light 
of this willingness to engage with the public on such issues, Amartya Sen’s arguments 
could prove the most useful, as France tries to navigate the best path through preserving 
its traditional ideological stance while acknowledging the diversity of its citizens.  Sen’s 
arguments imply that some recognition of diversity is necessary.  To view people as the 
collection of attributes, opinions, and interests that they embody rather than minimizing 
them to a single characteristic would likely go a long way in this situation in recognizing 
the many differences between Muslims on a large scale.  In his book, Sen asserts that the 
question for Britain is not the degree of multiculturalism in its model, but the type.  
Perhaps the same question can be true of France; that it need not abandon, but rather 
clarify, or update, its universalist ideals. Given that many of these principles, such as 
laïcité, have never been comprehensively codified, this seems a reasonable approach.  
Perhaps a 21st century French identity is in order, one that evolves with the population.  
This evolution appears consistent with Rousseau’s ideas even, that a society’s sense of 
itself would depend on and emerge organically from the community itself.  With Muslims 




MUSLIM IDENTITY IN EUROPE 
The following chapter contextualizes the French case within wider Europe.  Given 
some scholars’ assertion that the unique traditional French perspective presents an 
“exceptional” case,106 it is helpful to look to other countries for comparison to evaluate 
this claim and analyze on a broader level. Presented here is an overview of two cases of 
Great Britain and Germany, in order to better situate and compare the experiences of 
Muslims in France within a broader European context.  While this comparison attempts 
to avoid oversimplifications of national contexts, a general overview of the demographics 
and the main policy tendencies is helpful to show the variety that exists in both 
population and national context throughout Europe. This is followed by an analysis of 
common trends on the broader European level.  Scaling back from the French case to 
wider Europe shows several similar patterns of portraying and interacting with Muslim 
populations, both at the national and European levels.  
While many European countries have large Muslim populations that could be 
examined, these particular cases have been chosen for several reasons.  Both Great 
Britain and Germany are also home to significant Muslim populations that have been the 
subject of recent discussion and controversy.  In the wake of startling events such as the 
Rushdie Affair in Britain and an overall increasing concern with isolation of growing 
Muslim populations into “parallel societies,” a similar tendency has arisen in both 
countries to portray all Muslims as homogenous, violent, and unwilling to assimilate into 
society.  Furthermore, Britain and Germany present interesting political models with 
which to compare the French case.  Other scholars have examined these three countries in 
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comparison,107 with the British case in particular featuring often since it offers a near 
opposite approach to integration relative to the French.108 
Upon closer examination, the situations in these countries also present an 
informative illustration of the overall diversity of European Muslims and the political 
contexts in which they live.  British and German Muslims bring with them ties to 
completely different parts of the world with distinct cultural, religious, and political 
traditions and perspectives, varying relationships with their host countries, and unique 
backgrounds and immigration circumstances.  When combined with the unique political 
characters and integration approaches of Britain and German, within which Muslim 
communities must integrate and forge varying degrees of new identities, the result 
renders the condition of European Muslims extremely diverse.   
Despite this variety, however, a general trend persists across Europe to portray 
European Muslims as a simplified, uniform, and usually threatening group.  This mirrors 
the general French tendency to erroneously view its Muslim population in a similar light.  
This is likely the result of widespread media portrayals, politicians seeking to capitalize 
on populous fears, and a general trend towards policy convergence on the European 
political level.  These assumptions can be very dangerous, however, in leading to 
ineffectual policies and creating an inaccurate and often negative perception of Muslims 
that can result, as seen in the French case, in the development of stronger oppositional 
Muslim identities. 
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Great Britain  
Britain’s experience with its Muslim population offers an especially interesting 
point of reference for the French case.  Britain likewise welcomed many Muslims from 
former colonies into its borders during the years following World War II.  These 
populations exhibit many of the same divisions and diversity of French Muslims, 
contributing even more variety to the European Muslim population as a whole.  Generally 
speaking, this British Muslim community has faced many similar obstacles to integration 
as in the French case, often living isolated from mainstream society and battling 
discrimination and stereotypes.  However, Muslims in Britain also operate within a very 
different national political framework.  The British approach to integration is often 
portrayed as the textbook opposite to France’s method.109  Multiculturalism features as 
the cornerstone of an integration philosophy that focuses on race and ethnicity over other 
religion, differing sharply from the French universalist model and controversial history of 
laïcité.  Muslims from this population also hail from extremely different parts of the 
world, bringing their own distinct cultures and perspectives to this unique context.  
 As in France, many cross-cutting variables of ethnicity, background, socio-
economic circumstance, residence, and religious beliefs render the notion of a 
homogenous British Muslim population impossible. The demographics of Muslims in 
Britain show this variety in many regards.  Britain’s 1.6 million Muslims make up 
approximately 2.8% of its population110 and hail from an assortment of countries.  The 
relationship between Britain and the Muslim world also dates back quite far to the Middle 
Ages, since which time Britain’s Muslim population has grown intermittently.  The 
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British Empire contained such a large number of Muslims that the nineteenth-century 
statesman Lord Salisbury once claimed in a statement remarkably like that in the French 
context of the Paris Mosque construction, that Britain was “the greatest Islamic power on 
earth.”111 Yemeni immigrants established the first significant British Muslim community 
in the 19th century when they came to work on ships and then constructed the first British 
mosque in 1870.  Despite these longstanding ties, however, most Muslims today have 
origins in more recent waves of immigration that originated from former colonies in East 
Africa and Asia.  While the British government did not extend a formal invitation to 
immigrate through worker recruitment programs, many immigrated to the United 
Kingdom in search of employment opportunities following decolonization.  The 
partitioning of India and Pakistan also brought many Muslims from this region to the 
United Kingdom in the 1940s and 50s seeking an escape from the violence.  Muslim 
presence grew as families reunified over the following decades, with 361,000 
immigrating in 1971 alone.112  In the 1960s and 70s, immigration from East Africa 
increased greatly, particularly from Kenya and Somalia.  Within this group, however, 
many immigrants had roots in India, further diversifying the backgrounds of Muslim 
immigrants.  A wave of approximately 100,000 Bangladeshis arrived following the 
country’s independence from Pakistan in 1971, and finally, another wave in the 1980s 
and 90s of mainly Iranians, Turks, Yemenis, Egyptians, Moroccans, and Iraqis resulted in 
a very diverse population of 1.6 million Muslims in 2001. 
Divisions across national lines contribute to variety within the Muslim population 
in a number of ways.  Immigrants from different countries brought with them distinct 
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cultural and linguistic characteristics, but also very different national relationships with 
Great Britain, which influence the way they perceive, and are perceived by, their new 
communities.  Many immigrants come from former colonies, often implying a distinct 
relationship, compared to both other former colonies and countries never occupied by the 
British.  With British Muslims’ roots quite literally extending all over the globe, these 
differences in culture, language, and background were often quite pronounced.  Robert 
Pauly quotes Charles Husband as he emphasizes the necessity of speaking of “Muslim 
communities in the plural to underscore the empirical fact that Muslims belong to a 
variety of linguistic, regional and sectarian groups. The making of British Islam is an 
ongoing, unfinished process of experimentation, diversity and debate.”113 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Indian immigrants and their descendants make up the 
largest percentage of Muslims in the U.K., although there are significant populations of 
several groups.  Using figures by Robert Pauly, who cites a number of sources, the table 
below represents recent figures for the origins of Muslims in Britain.114 As shown, 
significant Muslim communities in the United Kingdom from around the world reflect 
diverse backgrounds. 
Table 1: National Origins of Muslims in Britain 







Other (esp. Nigeria, 
Malaysia) 
180,000 
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These national divisions often remain quite pronounced in Britain generations 
after immigrants arrive, with communities of Muslims of the same national origins 
tending to reside in common areas. For example, nearly half of British Pakistanis reside 
in Greater Manchester, West Midlands and West Yorkshire, while another third lives in 
Birmingham (110,000) and Bradford (96,000).  Nearly one half of British Bangladeshis 
live in London, while more than three quarters of Indian Muslims live in either London or 
Leicester.  These communities tend to be quite culturally distinct and insular, thus 
contributing to the continued national divisions, despite ties through British citizenship, 
shared beliefs in Islam, and often common experiences of economic hardship and 
discrimination. 
Economic depravity persists as a common theme among Muslim populations 
throughout Europe, and Britain is no exception, although socio-economic status does tend 
to vary somewhat across different populations within Britain.  For instance, Indian 
Muslims have seen some relative economic success compared with other groups, while 
Pakistanis and particularly Bangladeshis experience relatively greater poverty levels, in 
large part due to their traditionally higher levels of work in textile industries, which have 
slowed during recent years.  Income levels of Southeast Asians as a whole, however, 
differ strikingly from the majority population.  A study by the British Board of Health 
found that 90 percent of Bangladeshis and 70 percent of Pakistanis subside on less than 
10,000 pounds a year, compared to only 28 percent of the national population as a whole.  
Conversely, while 23 percent of British make 30,000 pounds or more, only 1 percent of 
Bangladeshis and 4 percent of Pakistanis earn this amount.115 However, even these 
economic characteristics vary quite substantially by area and other factors. For example, 
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in Manchester, which is home to a significant number of Pakistanis, this population fares 
quite well, often operating as professionals, manufacturers, and small business owners.116  
Britain’s Muslim population is likewise young and increasingly born in the U.K..  
At least 50 percent of Muslims in Britain have been born in Britain, while one third of the 
population is under 16 years of age, the highest for any population group.117 In some 
regions, Muslim children make up one third of the local youth population, predicting the 
demographic shift that will occur with Britain’s generally ageing population.  Half of 
Britain’s Muslims are under age 25, while 92 percent are under 50 years of age.118   
As in France, large differences in religious practices and traditions also cut across 
British Muslims.  These variations, while significant, are likewise poorly understood and 
often unacknowledged by the wider population. Robert Pauly lists several major 
misconceptions about Islam in Britain that paint the religion as a more negative and 
uniform practice marked by violence, indulgence, and opposition to Christianity.119  In 
actuality, religious beliefs among Muslims in Britain vary along similar lines as those in 
France, cutting across characteristics of national, generational, and personal difference. 
Given that Britain’s Muslims come from such distant regions, some of these differences 
can be quite prominent.  
Without the same controversial history of laïcité, religion has traditionally been 
given a freer reign in Britain.  As a result of this, mosque construction has grown 
enormously, with a rate of nearly 100 new mosques per year at present.  Nonetheless, this 
growth does not reflect a uniform presence, and indeed perhaps encourages religious 
plurality with more options for worship.  Muslim beliefs vary considerably by ethnic 
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group despite a societal tendency to perceive Muslims as a monolithic entity.  Similar to 
the situation in France, divides cut between branches of Sunni and Shiite Islam as well as 
across national and ethnic lines and manners of practicing.  For instance, even though 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis tend to follow Sunni Islam and rate their religion as very 
important to them, they seldom worship at the same mosques.120  Even within the same 
nationality, mosque attendance varies by region, with many imams recruited from 
specific villages to reflect and preserve the specific traditions of the region.  These imams 
usually focus heavily on the specific practices and politics of the sending country and 
hold little regard for ‘global’ Islamic movements. These different interpretations of Islam 
and varying political views transect this group and impede cohesive action and unified 
representation at the national level, as they do in France.  Furthermore, competition 
outside of religion, such as for scarce jobs, often reinforces divisions by nationality and 
ethnicity and thus works to prevent the development of common Muslim communities 
and bonds.121  
Only two Muslims have ever served in the British Parliament, and both instances 
served to divide Muslims more than to unite them behind political movement and 
progress.  More have managed to reach levels of local representation, however, with 
some being able to do so under the banner of the Islamic Party of Britain, which aimed to 
find common ground between Muslim sects and promote shared interests.  However this 
group suspended campaigns in 2003, citing its own internal divisions.  General Secretary 
Dr. Sahib Mustaqim Bleher stated that “British Muslims were too busy competing with 
each other for acceptance by the establishment” to be able to act cohesively to alter it.122  
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A growing number of Muslim political advocacy organizations exist among the Muslim 
population, although most serve very specific ethnic, regional, linguistic groups of local 
neighborhoods or cities, convened for a variety of causes and missions. 
In addition to the multitude of differences that exist between Muslims within the 
United Kingdom, specifics of the British approach also serve to differentiate the 
experience of British Muslims from others around the continent.  The British approach to 
citizenship, and thus to integration into British society, starkly contrasts that of the 
French.  In fact, these two countries are often portrayed as opposite ends of the 
integration spectrum, as they espouse diametrically opposed views of citizenship and its 
acquisition.123  In contrast to French universalism, the United Kingdom bases its political 
philosophy in multiculturalism, asserting that all cultures have equal value and protection 
under the law. British citizenship has also been traditionally tied to birth on British soil as 
jus solis, or citizenship through birthplace rather than ethnic heritage. While this 
traditional multiculturalist and open approach perhaps results in a slightly more favorable 
and respectful view of Muslim communities among the British population compared with 
others it also arguably contributes to the insular nature of many minority communities, in 
what many have termed ‘parallel societies’.124  In the absence of an emphasis on 
immigrants to integrate fully into society, and with culturally specific communities 
entrenched throughout the country, many often remain isolated in communities of 
ethnically similar populations. 
Britain has also tended to pursue its multicultural approach through a focus on 
race in Britain, viewing minorities through lenses of skin color or ethnicity, but not 
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religion. This complicates matters for British Muslims since they come from many 
different racial and ethnic backgrounds and also exacerbates national and ethnic 
differences that inhibit collective Muslim identity development or cohesive action.  While 
this slightly different perception of Muslims has evolved somewhat over time, Muslims 
still must work within a race-based legal system.  While Jews and Sikhs have been 
acknowledged as ethnic groups, Muslims do not receive this distinction, thus leaving 
them more vulnerable to religious discrimination that is technically not prohibited by 
British law.125  Some groups receive protection through their ethnicity as Pakistani or 
Arab, but not all qualify for, or wish to claim, racial minority status.  The absence of such 
legislation, which is imposed from the European level with the Treaty of Amsterdam but 
has not been addressed on a national level, marks a void in the British relationship with 
its Muslim population.  
Additional distinctions of the British case lie in its slightly different colonial 
interactions that often preceded its relationships with its Muslim citizens. The greater 
physical distance between Britain and its former colonies than France and North Africa 
arguably had implications for colonial rule.  Pauly asserts that this distance often resulted 
in a generally less violent transition to independence, and has led to less contemporary 
British influence over politics since independence.126 This leaves for a much freer foreign 
policy, with relationships with its Muslim populations remaining a domestic policy issue 
rather than one tied largely to post-colonial relationships and foreign policy.  This 
physical and relational distance may have perhaps led to a less frequent linking of 
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domestic and foreign issues involving Muslims, although these issues still arise in the 
linking of European contexts which will be discussed later.   
In the wake of the London bombings of 2005, as well as periods of unrest that 
have been attributed, rightly or not, to the failed integration of Muslims in the U.K., many 
have begun to question Britain’s traditional multicultural approach.  Some of its critics 
suggest that “these British bombers are a consequence of a misguided and catastrophic 
pursuit of multiculturalism” and that “in recent years [Britain has] focused far too much 
on the ‘multi’ and not enough on the common culture.”127  Many suggest that Britain has 
occupied a role on the far end of the integration policy spectrum for too long and that it 
should adopt policies demanding more integration of its minority populations. This 
tendency to evaluate domestic issues with an eye to contexts in other states proves typical 
of European countries seeking to address concerns with their own domestic integration 
concerns. 
The headscarf issue represents one area where Britain has particularly begun to 
question its multicultural approach.  In 2007, just three years after the French ban on 
headscarves in schools, British courts saw their own headscarf scandal brought forward, 
and they subsequently ruled that schools could forge their own codes relating to Islamic 
dress.128  Despite many reasons given by British Muslims for adopting Islamic 
clothing,129 the veil is increasingly viewed as beyond the scope of British multiculturalist 
tolerance. In the wake of the recent French movement to place restrictions on the wearing 
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of the niqab in public, similar debates have also emerged in Britain, reflecting 
internationalization of this debate and the questioning of traditional approaches.130  
Germany  
 Differing once more from the French and British contexts, the general German 
approach to integration has been influenced by a traditional notion that Germany is not a 
country of immigration, but one based on a sense of the nation. Contrasting the French 
model rooted in territoriality, political citizenship, and ideology, where one could 
theoretically “become” French, the German system takes as its foundation ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic, and racial characteristics that are less easily adopted.  Thus, despite 
the fact foreigners have accounted for 80 percent of Germany’s population growth over 
the last 50 years, few of them have easily transitioned to citizenship.131  While the 
country actively recruited foreign laborers after World War II as France did, it also 
considered them as temporary workers, rather than the permanent residents they would 
become.  The German case is also marked by legal entrenchment of these ideas within a 
historically strict interpretation of jus sanguinis, or citizenship through blood or ethnicity. 
Thus, the large populations of immigrants to Germany, and often their descendants 
generations later, were denied substantial legal rights and protection due to a lack of 
official citizenship status.  Only recently in 2000 has Germany lowered barriers to 
citizenship to allow for the naturalization of much of its Muslim population.  Within this 
view of citizenship marked by the sense of a German nation, however, Germany’s 
integration approach has proved to be one of tempered balance between the extremes of 
the French Republican and British multicultural models.  While rejecting outright 
assimilationism, Germany has wavered somewhat on the degree of multiculturalism it is 
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willing to accept in light of its traditional self-regard as a nation of ethnically and 
culturally similar Germans. 
 Germany is home to the second largest Muslim population in Europe, with 3 
million Muslims making up 3.6 percent of its population.132 Unlike France and Britain, 
however, Germany did not have a substantial Muslim population until after World War 
II, when it initiated the Federal Republic’s First Employment Agreement with Turkey in 
1961.  In an effort to spur on reconstruction and economic growth with cheap labor, the 
Federal Republic of Germany had previously made such agreements with Italy, Spain, 
and Greece, and proceeded to make others with Portugal, Tunisia and Morocco 
throughout the 1960s.  As in the French case, this worker recruitment, intended as 
temporary, resulted in large, permanent communities of Muslims in Germany.  The 
reunification of families, as well as the arrival of Kurdish Turks seeking escape from 
government repression enlarged this population throughout the 1960s and 70s, with Turks 
becoming the largest minority group in 1981.133 As in the French case, despite 
government measures aimed to encourage the return of existing immigrants and halt the 
flow of new ones, the Turkish population continued to grow through new generations, 
reaching 2.1 million by the end of the century.  In addition to the Turkish community, 
increased immigration from the Middle East and Asia in the wake of civil unrest, for 
instance, in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Iraq, brought the German Muslim population closer 
to the large and diverse group it is today. 
The table below illustrates the demographic composition of German Muslim 
populations in recent years.  The diversity of the group is apparent, with significant 
populations from 13 countries or regions.  The Central Asian community consists of 
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Muslims with roots in Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, further adding to the diversity of the mix. Additionally, while three quarters 
of German Muslims are of Turkish background, this population is also divided between 
ethnically Turkish and Kurdish communities, the latter of which numbers over 
400,000.134  Most demographic information tends to focus on Muslims of Turkish origin 
as a whole, however, since this group does make up a large majority of the Muslim 
population.  Because of this, most statistics in this study, taken largely from Robert 
Pauly’s book, Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization, will refer to the Turkish 
population specifically, even though they cannot necessarily reflect the situation of all 
German Muslims. 
Table 2: National Origins of Muslims in Germany 
Place of Origin Population 
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Along with substantial differences existing between Turkish and Kurdish 
communities, several other issues divide German Muslims and prevent cohesion.  For 
instance, while the majority of Muslims in Germany practices Sunni Islam, there are 
considerable populations of Iranian and Iraqi Muslims who are predominantly Shia.  
Most obstacles to uniting Muslims behind common issues, however, despite common 
need for reforms, stem once more from national and ethnic divisions.  One study suggests 
that ethnicity and not religion is the primary motivating factor behind political 
organizations in Germany.  According to the study, 82.5 percent of minority claims filed 
with the German government from 1990-95 came from groups organized around 
ethnicity or nationality rather than religion.136  Furthermore, while the Central Council of 
Muslims operates on the national level much as the CFCM in France, over 2000 
organizations with Islamic linkages operate on the regional level, reflecting a wide range 
of ethnicities, nationalities, social concerns that are often influenced by a plethora of 
international actors and issues abroad. Thus, despite efforts such as those in France to 
consolidate Muslims behind a single organization in the Council, Muslims in Germany 
defy generalization at this point. 
Nonetheless, some trends about the population become evident.  As in the French 
and British cases, Muslims in Germany are disproportionately young, often due to high 
fertility rates compared to native German populations. Studies have shown 70 percent of 
the Turkish population to be under the age of 30, while only five percent are 65 and 
older, compared with 17 percent of the overall population. 137  Muslims in Germany also 
tend to live in poor outskirts of mid to large sized cities, such as Berlin, Munich, 
Frankfurt, Duisberg, and Cologne.  Over three quarters of the Turkish population 
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specifically occupy urban areas, such as the neighborhood of Kreuzberg in Berlin, while 
35 percent of this group lives in the North Rhine-Westphalia district, the site of the 
original industrial plants that attracted workers in the 1960s.138  Other Muslim 
populations also tend to reside in urban areas throughout Germany and, as in Britain, 
exhibit tendencies towards isolation and the development of “parallel societies.”  
One reason for this isolation that marks a difference from the experiences of 
Muslims in Britain and France is a wide linguistic barrier faced by most German 
Muslims.  Since Germany did not have as strong a colonial presence, particularly in 
traditionally Muslim countries from which populations have come, immigrants do not 
often possess the language skills to match those of, for example, many Algerians 
immigrating to France.  Thus, with most populations arriving with low levels of German 
skills and subsequently living in ethnically insular communities, they experience an 
additional serious barrier to integration.  Many third generation immigrants still lack 
sufficient knowledge of German, a condition which results from an early disadvantage.139 
One study of Turkish families in Kreuzberg found that 63 percent of preschool children 
in the study “spoke little or no German and thus failed to meet the linguistic requirements 
for primary school.”140 This shortcoming in language acquisition contributes to especially 
low education levels among German Muslims.  Whereas 30 percent of native German 
students qualify for university admission, one study found that only 14 percent of Turkish 
students were eligible, and that 40 percent of young Turks had no vocational 
qualifications compared to 8 percent nationally.141 Insufficient language skills, 
educational and vocational deficiency, combined with the economic downturn and 
                                                 
 
 
138 Pauly, Robert, Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization (New York: Ashgate, 2004) 
139 Pauly, Robert, Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization (New York: Ashgate, 2004) 
140 Pauly, Robert, Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization (New York: Ashgate, 2004) 
141 Pauly, Robert, Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization (New York: Ashgate, 2004) 
 87 
widespread discrimination, contribute to low economic status that parallels the French 
and British situations. Many Muslim immigrants exist in Germany as blue-collar workers 
with little possibility for employment.   
Muslims in Germany do face many similar hurdles to those encountered by 
Muslims elsewhere in Europe in the perceived homogeneity of followers of Islam and the 
tendency to link domestic and international events.  One German Muslim describes this, 
asserting “that all Muslims are made to be responsible by the media for everything any 
single Muslim does at any place in the world in the name of Islam,” adding that “to cut 
through these layers of public prejudice and misinformation is the first prerequisite to a 
wider discussion acceptance of Islam in Germany.”142 
Germany has also seen a recent questioning of its traditional integration approach.  
As in the British case, the country began to reexamine its stance on Islamic dress in the 
wake of the French headscarf ban.  Several cases emerged as early as 2004 of schools 
banning headscarves, most often for teachers rather than students, while occasionally 
leaving loopholes for Christian crosses or nun’s habits.143  While the Constitutional Court 
declined to find scarves incompatible with German law, it left the issue to the states’ 
discretion, and today half of Germany’s states have restrictions on Islamic dress for 
teachers and other civil servants.  While some German politicians have shown a 
reluctance to compromise what many see as a history of warm relations with religious 
groups, popular support has often favored bans.  In 2004, then President Johannes Rau 
addressed the issue of the headscarf, referencing Germany’s distinct history with its 
Christian past and respect for religion and the state, saying that Germany was neither a 
religious nor a non-religious state and that it would respect the religious practices of all 
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citizens.144   He contrasted this history with French laïcité, saying that “I fear that the 
headscarf ban is the first step on the path to a secular state, banned religious signs and 
symbols from public life. This I do not want. That is not my idea of our country, for 
many centuries influenced by Christianity.”145  
 
Implications 
From this comparison with other European countries, several conclusions can be 
drawn regarding the French case and the wider European context. Firstly, the French 
exception often asserted by scholars, if it exists, is likely not in the nature of the issues 
the country seeks to address, but in its approach to addressing them.  This difference 
should not be exaggerated, however, since indeed, each country experiences some sense 
of exceptionalism, in that it approaches the issue of Muslim identity and citizenship from 
its own distinct history, philosophy, and conceptions of national identity. Specific issues 
and sticking points in France, Britain and Germany have emerged as a result of these 
countries’ different histories and contexts as well as the various characteristics and 
concerns of the vastly diverse Muslim populations living within them.  However, the 
essence of the question faced by each country of how to best incorporate Muslim identity 
in the face of great tendencies to generalize and oversimplify a complex population is 
shared.  Muslims in each context face hurdles in overcoming a widespread negative 
image of Islam pervasive within the European, and perhaps Western, worldview due to a 
growing Islamophobia often encouraged by media and politicians.  If the French case is 
exceptional, it is perhaps in the country’s insistence on a universal national identity after 
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decades, or arguably even centuries, of challenges from various sources, including 
immigration.  Just as Muslims within the country are portrayed as a monolithic threat, the 
traditional French identity is itself promoted as singular and allows no room for 
compromise with other identities.  This is reflected in the ongoing national identity 
debate, which will be addressed again later. 
Secondly, if anything can be taken from comparisons with these other European 
countries it is the wide range of backgrounds and circumstances of European Muslims.  
Hailing from all regions of the world from which they bring distinct sets of values and 
perspectives, Muslims in Europe are a diverse group, much more so on the European 
level than in France.  Thus, where it was difficult to pinpoint a cohesive identity amidst 
French Muslims, it is virtually impossible to do so on a European scale.  In addition to 
the differences immigrants have brought with them from their range of countries of 
origin, they also are now functioning within the distinctive national contexts of their new 
countries, where they confront many specific issues and concerns. Nonetheless, the 
tendency remains to classify this group in a unified, and generally negative, light.   
To emphasize the differences between European Muslims and the inaccuracy of any 
assumptions of the similarity of these populations and their situations, the table below 
shows the general differences between the three cases mentioned in this study.  Even 
using gross generalizations that neglect the many differences existing within Muslim 









Table 3: Muslims in France, Great Britain, and Germany 
 France Great Britain Germany 
Percent of 
Population 
8% 2.8% 3.6% 
Majority 
ethnic makeup 
North African South Asian Turkish 
Former 
colonial status 





Multicultural Mixed  
Main point of 
tension 
Religion vs. laïcité Religion vs. Race Citizenship 
View of 
Muslims 
Religion Race Immigrant 
Citizenship Mixed Jus Solis Jus Sanguinis 
 
Thirdly, another important tendency on the European level deserving of 
discussion is the proclivity of governments in Europe to view their own domestic issues 
through the lens of international events.  This was seen in the French case, particularly 
during the headscarf debate, and is symptomatic of a wider tendency in Europe.  
However, while international circumstances in the Middle East and North Africa 
influenced the direction of the French headscarf debate, increasingly influence is coming 
from within Europe.  As European countries adopt measures aimed at mitigating the 
integration difficulties of their own populations, oftentimes, similar policies will appear 
on the political agenda in other countries, despite different populations and contexts. For 
example, the recent Swiss referendum on the construction of minarets had rippling effects 
throughout Europe, as other countries began to consider their own bans.  Whereas 
minarets had not featured as an issue in most other European countries before this point, 
they quickly arose as such after the Swiss vote.  National polls suddenly showed that 
majorities in other countries favored similar bans.  Le Figaro reported that 73.7 percent 
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polled in France supported a ban on minaret construction,146 while the magazine 
L’Express put the figure even higher at 88 percent.147 Similarly, 80 percent of Spaniards 
in an El Mundo poll and 86 percent of Germans surveyed by Die Welt supported the 
Swiss decision.148  The issue of minarets sprouted up all over Europe in reaction to the 
referendum of a single country.  
This support is often initially confined to popular opinion, with politicians 
showing more hesitance and reluctance to alienate Muslim populations.  However, with 
widespread support to be gained, there is an incentive to mimic the popular measures 
taken in other countries.  For example, while polls showed wide support for the minaret 
ban among citizens, most political leaders denounced it initially.  Despite French citizens’ 
wide support for the ban, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner publically criticized 
the decision, saying that "[i]t is an expression of intolerance and I detest intolerance. I 
hope the Swiss will reverse this decision quickly."149  Similar reactions occurred in 
Sweden, where Foreign Minister Carl Bildt stated that "[i]t's an expression of quite a bit 
of prejudice and maybe even fear, but it is clear that it is a negative signal in every way, 
there's no doubt about it,"150 despite polls indicating that less than half of the respondents 
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in a Swedish survey were in favor of continued minaret construction in Sweden.151  Other 
politicians, however, perhaps noting the political gains to be made given the popular 
support, have shown more favorable responses to the Swiss decision.  French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy encouraged understanding of the Swiss position and took a lukewarm 
position, implying that France “does not necessarily need” more minarets, while another 
UPM minister has said publicly that “minarets symbolize the land of Islam, and France is 
not a land of Islam.”152 Thus, while most officials elsewhere spoke of their 
disappointment over the Swiss decision, there is a sense that domestic votes may be 
gained should politicians decide to support a similar course of action.   That the minaret 
ban has become public debate in so many countries following the Swiss decision shows 
the extent to which European policies have become “contagious” in today’s political 
climate often marked by fear of Islamization. 
Similar tendencies have also been seen with the French discussion on banning 
Islamic dress in public spaces.  While the reasoning used in France in banning the 
headscarf in schools has been quite specific to the French context of laïcité and freedom 
from religion in the public sphere, other countries have begun to adopt the measure, as 
seen in Britain and Germany, contrary to the initial reactions of political leaders.  A 
recent article from the BBC shows this tendency clearly, in expressing British reactions 
to the French decision to place restrictions on the wearing of the burqa in public 
spaces.153  The article, entitled “Should the U.K. ban the Muslim face veil?” discusses the 
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possibility of a similar measure in the U.K.  While Schools Secretary Ed Balls responded 
to the French decision by saying that it was “’not British’ to tell people what to wear in 
the street,”154 much popular support exists for a similar ban, with one poll claiming that 
two thirds of Britons support such a law.155 Restrictions on the full Islamic covering have 
also made it onto the political agendas of Germany156 and Italy.157  With polling data such 
as this, some fear further exploitation of these issues for political gain. Under pressure to 
deal with public concerns, politicians likely seek to promote themselves as actively rather 
than passively addressing issues with Muslim populations.    
President Sarkozy hinted at the pressures of such popular fears resulting from the 
media focus as he was quoted following the Swiss referendum as “deploring the 
‘excessive’ French media coverage of the event.”158  There is perhaps some truth in this 
indictment of the media in the portrayal of events involving Muslims.  In stirring fears 
and drawing quick conclusions about such events, pressure mounts for political leaders to 
address similar concerns within their own domestic sphere.  However, politicians are 
likewise guilty of stirring fears to their own advantage, as seen in the French example.  
This contagion effect of policies on the European level is worrisome for several 
reasons.  For one thing, it encourages a homogenous view of Muslims on a wide scale, 
which, as seen above, is wholly inaccurate.  Muslims in France differ widely from 
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Muslims in Britain, which are not similar to Muslims in Switzerland.  Furthermore, this 
policy spreading tendency results in legislation that is reactionary rather than designed to 
address actual domestic concerns and thus risks being ineffectual at best and quite 
possibly harmful at worst.  In feeding off of reactionary fears, governments promote a 
generally homogenous view of Muslims in encouraging the assumption that what is good 
for one country must be good for another.  This view also generally tends to be a 
distinctly negative one with little understanding for the nuances of Muslim experience.  
As seen in the French case, with this increased negative portrayal comes often an 
increased identification with Islam as an identifying feature.  Thus, in seeking to limit the 
influence of a global Islam within their borders with measures to decrease its visibility, 
many countries may actually be encouraging its growth. 
This convergence of policy on the European level may also imply an emerging 
European identity and an increased value for European wide policies and approaches 
encouraged by the integration of the EU.  With citizens increasingly looking to their 
European neighbors for policy solutions, there is perhaps an increased sense that policies 
should be shared at the European level.  While the EU has passed very little legislation on 
the issue of integration, the common adoption of similar policies could also be interpreted 
as a look to Europe for a solution to a perceived common problem.   
While the definition of a common European identity has arisen as a much sought 
after goal for European leaders and scholars alike,159 its development in this context 
could be very dangerous.  Developing a common European identity around the issue of 
growing fears of Muslim populations would encourage the very “us versus them” 
mentality that many Islamophobic scholars and politicians have been describing, and 
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would likely polarize and stigmatize Muslims rather than encourage integration.  Rather, 
if a common stance is going to be taken, it should be one committed to increased 
acknowledgement of and education about the diversity of Muslims in Europe.  As 
Amartya Sen has asserted, to prevent the emergence of identities around a single 
characteristic, we must view people as the multifaceted collection of identities that they 
represent.  Perhaps with this increased willingness to look outward for solutions to the 
question of integration, there is room for the EU to take a greater role in the debate. 
However, at a time when the development of European identity is also an important and 
much debated issue160 it would be an especially beneficial and empowering step to also 
involve Muslims, while recognizing their diversity and resisting the urge to generalize 
and oversimplify, in this process.  Most Muslims in Europe are citizens and therefore 
should factor into the development and promotion of any European identity in the future. 
                                                 
 
 






 Having demonstrated the complexity of the Muslim population in Europe and the 
implications of continued misrepresentation of domestic and international political issues 
involving Muslims, this chapter returns to conceptions of national identity in France.  I 
discuss the role of French national identity in recent years, including the results of the 
controversial French national identity debate and its implications for French Muslims 
before offering conclusions of this study.  
Debating French National Identity 
Events of recent years have confirmed the continued importance of national 
identity in French politics as well as the willingness of politicians to use the supposed 
threat of minority identities for political gain. Despite the persistence of this latter trend, 
however, there is perhaps some hope for progress to be found in the widespread negative 
reaction to the recent government-led national identity debate.  Such reactions suggest a 
rejection of continued politicization of integration and identity issues and hint at an 
evolving perception of identity as multifaceted.   
Issues of integration and national identity played an important role in the 2007 
French presidential elections, signifying the enduring relevance of these issues to voters 
and politicians. Both second round candidates in the elections devoted considerable 
amounts of time to discussions of these topics.  Nicolas Sarkozy, with a long history of 
involvement in integration issues, balanced commitment to a strict law and order 
approach in dealing with immigrants with a demonstrated willingness to negotiate some 
principles of laïcité through government dialogue with religious groups.  He pledged to 
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link identity and integration with the creation of a new cabinet ministry position for 
integration, immigration and national identity, as well as to bring the French people 
closer to the national identity and immigration issues through public debate. Even his 
opponent, Ségolène Royal, known for her more moderate stance on integration issues, 
attempted to gain political ground in the first round by emphasizing the importance of 
national identity in alluding to a duty for all homes to own a French flag and sing “La 
Marseillaise” on Bastille Day. After Sarkozy’s victory, he quickly fulfilled his campaign 
promise in establishing the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and 
Solidarity Development, which has since become the topic of some controversy.   
 With Integration Minister Eric Besson, President Sarkozy launched a widely 
publicized debate on French national identity in November of 2009.  Presented as a 
dialogue at the local and national levels to consider French national identity and its role 
today, the debate presented questions to be discussed by students, teachers, workers, 
unions, and officials. The main questions explored the basis of French identity and the 
effects of immigration, with other more specific prompts also featuring in the discussion.  
The administration created a government website where the public could respond to 
questions by posting ideas concerning French identity and expressing personal opinions.  
As the conversation unfolded it triggered discussion of many of the anticipated traditional 
ideas about liberté, égalité, and fraternité, as well as laïcité, gender equality, and much of 
the usual rhetoric from politicians.   
The launching of the national identity debate and the creation of ministerial 
position itself also sparked controversy, however, and drew pointed criticism from 
scholars, politicians, and citizens, who accused the government of using these as tools in 
an attempt to score easy political points.  Many claimed that the national identity debate 
was deliberately timed to redirect attention from more serious issues, such as the 
suffering economy and the effects of the global financial crisis, in the months leading up 
to regional elections. With Sarkozy’s Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) struggling 
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as well against a crisis of public image due to internal problems, such as former President 
Chirac’s trial for corruption charges, many protested the identity debates as a political 
stunt. Additional criticism came from others who claimed that the identity debate would 
only serve to further stigmatize and alienate immigrants, since it left little room for their 
experiences in the focus on traditional institutions of French identity.161 Criticism also 
focused on the timing of the debate in light of other domestic and international issues 
concerning Muslims, such as the Swiss minaret ban and the French debate over the burqa, 
and suggested that these links would misguide a debate and further distance French 
Muslims.  In response to the debate, the antiracism group, SOS Racisme, presented a 
petition signed by over 200 influential thinkers and public figures, which was published 
by the journal Liberation. Signatories claimed that the national identity debate was “at 
best stigmatizing, at worst racist” and should be ended.162   
Thus, despite a favorable view at the outset, support for the national identity 
debate dwindled as criticism mounted over the reasons behind the debate and the 
implications of the way it was being carried out. By the end, half of those surveyed 
thought the debate should be suspended or stopped altogether, with many of these citing 
that they found it to be unhelpful or offensive. Only one in three viewed the debate 
favorably by the end, compared with the 60 percent who approved of it at the outset.   
Due to such large amounts of criticism and controversy, the debate concluded 
with very little attention, in contrast to the wide promotion it received from the 
government when it was initiated. On February 8, 2010, Prime Minister Fillon announced 
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the results and recommendations, which were viewed as mostly slight and symbolic 
gestures needed to extract the government from the debates and related criticism.  
Recommendations included emblematic requirements for schools to fly the French flag 
and to display the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in classrooms, both of which 
are regularly performed by many schools already, and for students to keep "Young 
Citizen's Logs" in which to record their civic actions. Recommended measures also 
included increased, although vague and unspecified, linguistic and integration 
requirements for naturalized foreigners.163  
While the recommendations yielded few concrete outcomes, results of a survey by 
the Office of the Minister of Integration did present some interesting information 
concerning notions of national identity in France.  Responses to the survey suggested that 
an overwhelming 82 percent of citizens continue to believe that a French identity does 
indeed exist, with 75 percent claiming they are proud to be French.  Thus, despite the 
negative reactions provoked by the politicization of the identity debate, most French 
citizens questioned appeared to find the subject to be of some importance.  Interesting as 
well are the responses to questions concerning identities other than national. Of those 
surveyed, 39 percent claimed to feel French only, while 32 percent said they think of 
themselves to be both French and European citizens, suggesting that European 
supranational identity is also gaining importance.  Another 13 percent described 
themselves as citizens of the world, while only 1 percent said they consider themselves to 
be a citizen of another country only.164  However, 74 percent of those surveyed agreed 
that French national identity had been weakened, with 30 percent of these attributing this 
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decline to immigration, 20 percent to the loss of values, 18 percent to ethnic and cultural 
diversity, 13 percent to religion, and 11 percent to politics.165 These results suggest that, 
while the public may not have approved of the way in which the national identity debate 
was conducted, national identity and immigration remain issues of importance and 
concern.  However, in the criticism there is perhaps hint of a movement towards 
demanding a more deliberate and respectful dialogue on these subjects. 
Implications of the Debate: Moving towards Complex Identity? 
The conduct of the national identity debate and the resulting controversy 
concerning the discussions and the role of the minister suggest several implications for 
political identity in France.  The focus of the French presidential candidates, and 
subsequently of President Sarkozy during his term, on subjects of integration and 
identity, as well as French citizens’ agreement on the importance of national identity, 
shows the weight that these topics continue to carry in France.  Their discussion at 
strategic moments during campaigns also demonstrates an ongoing willingness on the 
part of French politicians to capitalize on such concerns for political gain.  At first glance, 
the national identity debate seems to follow the same patterns as seen in previous 
discussions by perpetuating stereotypes and exploiting fears.  Issues of national identity 
appear again complicated by other international and domestic concerns such as the Swiss 
minaret ban and the controversy over the banning of the burqa, and French Muslims once 
more portrayed as a threat to national identity that must be guarded against by a 
ministerial position and further reinforced by a stigmatizing national debate.   
There is also, however, perhaps reason to hope for the evolution of a more 
nuanced identity interpretation in the wake of this latest debate.  The rejection by many 
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de-sondes_846941.html (accessed March 29, 2010) 
 101
French citizens of the politicization of the national identity debate, as shown by opinion 
polls and then in the success of the opposition party in regional elections, in which 
Sarkozy’s UMP party received only 35 percent of the vote to the Socialists’ 54 percent, 
suggests that the French public may be tiring of the continued use of national identity as a 
political tool.166  The results of the survey by Minister Besson are also encouraging in 
implying that traditionally exclusive notions of national identity may be evolving towards 
more multifaceted interpretations. That only about a third of the French surveyed thought 
of themselves as exclusively French suggests that many are beginning to view identity as 
more than national citizenship.  Recognition of European and global sources of identity 
even amidst a national identity debate and widespread acknowledgment of the 
importance of French nationalism imply that many are coming to view their own identity 
as more nuanced and complex. 
One posting from the government-sponsored website for the debate exemplifies 
this rejection of singular identity and manipulative political tactics.  This contributor 
responds to the question “what is French identity?” by saying that: “être français ... c’est 
être européen et ouvert sur les autres. C’est ne pas mettre au sein d’un même ministère 
immigration [et] identité nationale.”167 This quote, and others like it throughout the 
protest against the identity debates, hints at an acknowledgement of the limitations of 
universalism and perhaps a demand for a shift towards a more comprehensive and 
pluralist interpretation of French identity.  That so many French citizens believe national 
identity to still be an important part of their country suggests that this form of identity is 
                                                 
 
 
166 The UMP currently retains control over only one of France’s 26 regions.  
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not fading as an integral part of French conceptions of citizenship, but the hostility 
displayed towards the manner in which the debate has been steered by the government 
reveals a certain contestation of the politicization of the subject and the need for more 
critical, self-reflexive and even individualized interpretations. 
 Another encouraging step towards appreciation of complex political identities was 
seen in the European Union’s Year of Intercultural Dialogue.  This initiative by the 
European Commission funded projects throughout 2008 aimed at promoting exchange 
and understanding between various countries as well as subnational, and transnational 
communities.  The program highlighted the evolving sense of identity within Europe, 
encouraging the expression of the many ways in which to be “European.”  Of particular 
interest was the focus on religious and cultural minorities in several sponsored events, 
such as a week of Christian-Muslim dialogue designed to move participants beyond 
“simplistic view[s] of each other due to centuries of rejection and conflict” and an 
internet project for children created to combat racism and ethnic stereotypes.168  Another 
project empirically examined “how differences within European societies can be taken 
into account without creating conflict or exclusion” by speaking with youths in schools 
across Europe in hopes of establishing a European perspective on openness and “mutual 
respect across religious and cultural differences.”169  That respectful dialogue concerning 
such subjects is being encouraged on a European level also bodes well for the future of 
identity politics in Europe.  
Conclusions 
Despite these hints at evolution in identity perceptions, much progress remains to 
be made concerning the status of Muslims in France and broader Europe.  Real issues 
                                                 
 
 
168 http://www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu/1227.0.html?&L=0 (accessed March 29, 2010) 
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persist among this population that limit prospects for the future.  Poverty and 
unemployment levels among European Muslims remain chronically high, and problems 
such as discrimination, marginalization, and violence continue.  However, the first step to 
confronting these issues must be the recognition of the diversity of experience and 
complexity of the Muslim population, lest the “solutions” serve to contribute to the 
problems.  In approaching dialogues and debates concerning Muslims in Europe, more 
deliberate attention towards the portrayal of this population is needed in order to avoid 
falling into the same patterns of stigmatizing Muslim identity throughout Europe. 
European Muslims embody a wide range of ethnic, political, national, and religious 
identities, and their continued classification as unified based on one shared characteristic 
ignores these differences and contributes to a misrepresentation of a more complex 
reality. Furthermore, greater care must be taken to avoid stereotyping Muslims according 
to international circumstances and events, which tend to contribute to the negative 
perceptions of European Muslims.  The continued portrayal of this population as a 
homogenous, radical community and the implementation of reactionary policies based on 
international events risks contributing to the formation of an oppositional identity among 
Muslims in Europe.  Given the harmful effects of such portrayals and reactions, it is 
imperative that more nuanced conceptions of identity be promoted by scholars, 
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